Reform or a power play of Bashundhara?

The government’s plan to open Bangladesh’s refined petroleum fuel import, storage, transportation, distribution and marketing to private companies is being presented as a reform aimed at improving efficiency, ensuring uninterrupted supply and curbing the black market.

But behind the language of competition lies a far more troubling possibility: the transfer of control over a strategically vital sector from a state monopoly to a private oligopoly.

The most disturbing aspect is the reported role of Bashundhara Group, whose proposal to handle nearly half of the country’s fuel demand has raised serious questions about whether the reform is being designed to promote genuine competition or to create space for a powerful conglomerate to secure a dominant position in the energy market.

Fuel is not an ordinary commercial commodity. It powers transport, agriculture and industry, influences food and production costs and has implications for electricity generation and national economic stability. Whoever controls a substantial portion of its import, storage and distribution can exercise enormous economic influence.

That is why the reported push by Bashundhara for a major share of the market deserves particularly close scrutiny.

A private company seeking access to a large segment of a strategic market is perfectly legitimate. But a government policy that could enable one corporate group to control a substantial part of the supply chain demands exceptional transparency and safeguards.

The danger is that Bangladesh could end up replacing one form of concentration with another. Instead of a state-controlled system, consumers could face a market dominated by a handful of financially powerful conglomerates with the infrastructure, port access, storage capacity and financing needed to import fuel on a large scale.

The country’s regulatory weakness makes the prospect even more alarming. The Bangladesh Energy Regulatory Commission (BERC) reportedly has 10 regulations pending with the government for around 15 years.

Experts have also questioned whether the commission currently possesses adequate legal and administrative authority to regulate powerful private fuel operators effectively.

The question, therefore, is simple: why open a multi-billion-dollar strategic market before putting the regulator in a position to control it?

The government’s handling of the policy process also raises eyebrows. An 11-member committee formed under Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation reportedly opposed a private company’s application to import refined fuel in a report dated 21 July. Yet on 6 August, the ministry instructed BPC to prepare a draft private-sector refined fuel policy by 10 August. Such haste is difficult to reconcile with the magnitude of the proposed change.

Nor is it convincing to argue that private participation will automatically reduce prices. Private companies are commercial entities whose primary objective is profit.

If imports, storage, transportation and distribution become concentrated in a few hands, there is a real risk of price manipulation, coordinated behaviour and higher costs for consumers.

The Bashundhara question must therefore be examined not as a dispute over one company but as a test of Bangladesh’s energy governance. If the group’s reported bid for a huge share of the market is allowed without open competition, transparent licensing and strict ownership and market-share safeguards, the country could effectively institutionalise corporate dominance over a strategic resource.

Private participation itself is not the problem. Properly regulated competition can improve efficiency, investment and supply security. The problem arises when privatisation becomes a vehicle for concentration.

Before approving the policy, the government should publish the draft, disclose the basis on which private operators will be selected, strengthen BERC, approve its long-pending regulations and establish firm safeguards against cartelisation, market manipulation and excessive concentration.

Bangladesh must not allow a strategic energy market to become the preserve of a few corporate giants. If the reported efforts by Bashundhara to secure a commanding position are allowed to shape the market without adequate checks, the reform could become less about competition and more about corporate capture.

Energy security cannot be outsourced to corporate power. A private monopoly-or an oligopoly dressed up as competition-is not reform. It is simply a new form of concentration, with the cost ultimately borne by consumers and the wider economy.