Rohingyas still denied the right to return
Nearly nine years after the largest influx of Rohingya refugees into Bangladesh, not a single refugee has returned to Myanmar, despite repeated diplomatic initiatives, international pledges and mediation efforts led by China.
The arrival of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh fleeing persecution in Myanmar dates back to the late 1980s.
However, the largest influx occurred in August 2017, when around 750,000 people sought refuge in Bangladesh following a military crackdown in Myanmar’s Rakhine State.
Since then, successive governments in Bangladesh and international stakeholders have pursued repatriation initiatives, with China playing a mediating role.
Yet, despite repeated negotiations and substantial international assistance for refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar, the prospect of a safe and sustainable return remains uncertain.
On 5 November, Bangladesh again sought China’s continued diplomatic support for the early, safe and sustainable repatriation of forcibly displaced Rohingyas to Myanmar.
The two countries also discussed expanding bilateral cooperation in political engagement, trade, investment, connectivity and development.
Speaking to The New Nation, MdKamruzzaman, then director general (Myanmar wing) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said the government had outlined its priorities and plans in its election manifesto.
“Resolving the Rohingya issue is one of BNP’s top priorities, and we are already working to address the problem,” he said.
Asked about progress in discussions with China, he said, “We are working to arrange dialogue between Bangladesh and China, along with other stakeholders including Pakistan, to repatriate the Rohingyas to their homeland.”
The Awami League government was in power during the 2017 influx. Following its ouster during the July Uprising in 2024, an interim government led by Muhammad Yunus assumed office for around 18 months.
On 25 August 2025, Yunus presented a seven-point proposal aimed at ensuring the sustainable return of Rohingyas. It called for a roadmap for safe, sustainable and voluntary repatriation; adequate international funding; an immediate cessation of violence by Myanmar’s military and the Arakan Army (AA); a dialogue platform to guarantee Rohingya rights, citizenship and inclusion; stronger engagement by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); greater accountability for crimes against humanity; and full implementation of the International Court of Justice’s provisional measures to prevent genocide.
However, few of these proposals have translated into tangible progress.
International law expert Nadia Islam told The New Nation that the international community needed to coordinate its efforts by balancing accountability, diplomatic pressure and incentives to break the cycle of failed repatriation.
Otherwise, she warned, the seven-point proposal risked becoming another aspirational framework without implementation.
The BNP, which won the 12 February 2026 election and returned to power after 25 years, also pledged in its manifesto to intensify international efforts for the safe, voluntary and dignified repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar with citizenship rights.
China’s strategic interests and the repatriation deadlock
China’s role as a mediator has so far failed to produce a meaningful breakthrough.
Its relationship with Myanmar is shaped by strategic and economic considerations, including border security, investments under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), energy pipelines and its influence over Myanmar’s political and armed actors.
Abdullah Al-MonzurHussain, a law professor at Dhaka International University, told The New Nation that Rohingya repatriation should not be viewed solely through the lens of Bangladesh-Myanmar bilateral relations.
It must also be understood in the context of how the two countries’ interests influence and shape the international response to the crisis.
Nadia Islam said, “Beijing prefers to treat its Belt and Road investments, energy pipelines, and geopolitical influence in Myanmar as a higher priority than the reality of Rohingya statelessness or an accountability mechanism for all those responsible.”
“Continued fighting between the junta and ethnic armed groups creates additional uncertainty over voluntary safe return,” Nadia Islam added.
RohanGunaratna, a global security affairs specialist and professor at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, saidcontinued fighting between the junta and ethnic armed groups creates additional uncertainty over voluntary safe return.
Diplomatic efforts since 2017
In November 2017, Bangladesh and Myanmar signed a bilateral repatriation agreement and established a joint working group.
China mediated talks in Beijing in 2018, encouraging a bilateral solution. In 2019, Bangladesh, Myanmar and China agreed to establish a ground-level mechanism to assess the repatriation process.
China hosted several rounds of talks in 2020 and 2021, promoting a pilot repatriation project in Rakhine State.
However, the initiatives produced no binding commitments or explicit guarantees concerning security, rights and citizenship. Beijing largely treated the crisis as an internal matter for Myanmar.
In 2021, China reaffirmed its support for Myanmar’s sovereignty and encouraged phased repatriation based on verification. Subsequent discussions in 2021-22 stressed that any return should be voluntary, safe and orderly, while taking account of stability in Rakhine.
At a 2022 meeting between former foreign minister AK Abdul Momen and then Chinese ambassador Li Jiming at State Guest House Padma, China acknowledged the challenges, but no clear repatriation timeline emerged.
During former prime minister Sheikh Hasina’s 2024 meeting with Chinese Premier Li Qiang, Beijing pledged support for bilateral efforts and urged Myanmar’s cooperation. However, concrete commitments remained absent.
China’s ties with Myanmar’s armed groups
Since 2019, China has pursued a three-pronged approach towards Myanmar, combining engagement with military and civilian authorities, influence over ethnic armed groups and deeper economic integration.
The two countries share a border stretching more than 2,100 kilometres, making Myanmar strategically important to Beijing, according to a 30 October 2025 report by Commercial Dispute Resolution.
China’s economic interests include the Kyaukpyu Special Economic Zone and oil and gas pipelines connecting Rakhine State to Yunnan. Beijing has proposed 38 projects under the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), but 29 remain unapproved amid continuing instability, according to The Diplomat on 3 February 2025.
Meanwhile, Beijing has vetoed UN resolutions condemning Myanmar’s actions in Rakhine and criticised the UN Human Rights Council for internationalising the issue, according to The Guardian.
For the hundreds of thousands of Rohingyas living in Bangladesh, however, diplomatic negotiations and geopolitical calculations have yet to deliver the most fundamental of human rights: the opportunity to return home safely, with dignity, citizenship and protection.
