Bangladesh’s Gas Crisis Is a Crisis of Governance, Not Geology

Bangladesh is not running out of gas overnight. It is running out of time, foresight, and perhaps most dangerously, excuses.

The country’s growing energy crisis is often described as a geological problem, as if nature alone is responsible for shrinking reserves and mounting shortages.

Yet the numbers tell a different story. Bangladesh’s gas crisis is less a failure of the earth than a failure of governance. It is the cumulative result of decades of postponed decisions, misplaced priorities, and an enduring preference for buying certainty abroad instead of building it at home.

The latest figures should serve as a national wake-up call. According to an analysis published by The Daily Bonik Barta based on Petrobangla’s latest reserve report, Bangladesh currently has only 20 producing gas fields.

Their recoverable reserves have already declined from 6,321 billion cubic feet (BCF), or just over 6.3 trillion cubic feet (TCF), in January this year to approximately 6 TCF by June.

At the current extraction rate of about 58 BCF every month, local production has fallen to around 700 BCF annually.

Even after including abandoned and non-producing fields, the country’s total reserve stands at only 7.63 TCF. In practical terms, existing domestic reserves may sustain production for only another eight years if no significant discoveries are made.

The arithmetic is frightening. But the politics behind the arithmetic should frighten us even more.
Natural gas is unlike many other natural resources. It cannot be manufactured, negotiated into existence, or imported indefinitely without economic consequences.

Every cubic foot extracted today must eventually be replaced by new discoveries tomorrow. That is the unwritten contract every gas-producing nation signs with its future. Bangladesh quietly stopped honouring that contract years ago.

Instead of treating exploration as a continuous national obligation, we gradually accepted depletion as something that could be managed through imports. Liquefied natural gas became more than an emergency supplement.

It evolved into a substitute for ambition. Rather than asking why domestic reserves were not growing, public debate increasingly revolved around how many more LNG cargoes could be purchased.

There is nothing inherently wrong with importing LNG. Every energy-importing nation relies on international markets to some extent. The mistake lies in confusing a bridge with a destination. Imports should buy time for exploration, not replace exploration altogether.

Perhaps the most revealing aspect of the current crisis is that Bangladesh still possesses gas that remains trapped beneath the ground. The Daily Bonik Barta reports that ten abandoned or non-producing gas fields still contain approximately 1,334 BCF of recoverable reserves.

Five abandoned fields alone account for at least 661 BCF, including 447 BCF in Chhatak, 89 BCF in Sangu, 62 BCF in Feni, and 44 BCF in Kamta.

These are not imaginary resources. They exist. Yet they contribute almost nothing to easing today’s supply crisis because technical complications, legal disputes, infrastructure delays, and institutional inertia have kept them disconnected from the national energy system.

That reality fundamentally changes the conversation. Bangladesh is not merely suffering from resource depletion. It is suffering from resource paralysis.

Even newly discovered fields illustrate the same pattern. Bhola North, discovered in 2018 with an estimated reserve of 435 BCF, remains outside commercial production.

Zakiganj, discovered in 2021 with around 52 BCF, could not be connected to the national grid because pipeline infrastructure has yet to be completed.

Another field discovered in Bhola’s Ilisha area in 2023 also remains idle. We celebrate discoveries but struggle to convert discoveries into supply. Geological success repeatedly collides with administrative failure.

Meanwhile, the country’s knowledge infrastructure has been quietly ageing. Modern gas exploration depends on sophisticated three-dimensional seismic surveys, digital reservoir modelling, artificial intelligence-assisted geological interpretation, and advanced drilling technologies.

Yet many of Bangladesh’s seismic surveys are between ten and fifteen years old. Expecting new discoveries from outdated geological information is rather like expecting modern navigation from obsolete maps. The landscape has changed even if the coordinates have not.

The imbalance in investment priorities is equally revealing. According to the daily, Bangladesh spent approximately Tk 2.5 trillion importing LNG between the 2018-19 and 2024-25 fiscal years. Petrobangla expects another Tk 510 billion worth of LNG imports during the current fiscal year.

By contrast, state-owned exploration companies received only around Tk 700 billion in investment over the twenty-three years between 2000 and 2023. While imports became increasingly expensive, domestic exploration never received comparable strategic attention.

This is not merely a budgetary imbalance. It reflects an imbalance in national imagination.
The Bibiyana gas field offers an instructive contrast.

The Hydrocarbon Unit originally estimated Bibiyana’s reserves at 5,755 BCF, while Petrobangla’s later assessment increased that figure to 7,666 BCF following continued development and improved technological understanding.

Better science, sustained investment, and modern field management altered the country’s understanding of its largest producing field. The lesson extends well beyond Bibiyana. Geological knowledge evolves when exploration continues. Resources are often expanded not by luck but by persistent technological effort.

Bangladesh’s gas crisis is therefore inseparable from its industrial future. Every factory operating below capacity because of inadequate gas supply represents lost exports, reduced employment, and diminished investor confidence. Reliable energy is no longer simply a utility.

It is economic infrastructure. Investors evaluating Bangladesh’s manufacturing potential increasingly assess the reliability of energy before considering labour costs or market access. Energy insecurity eventually becomes investment insecurity.

The crisis also carries profound geopolitical implications. Dependence on imported fuel exposes Bangladesh to volatile international prices, shipping disruptions, currency depreciation, and global conflicts beyond its control. Every additional unit of imported energy reduces strategic autonomy.

Energy security, therefore, is not merely an engineering objective. It is an element of national sovereignty.

The encouraging news is that the solutions remain available, even if they are no longer easy.

Bangladesh has capable geologists, experienced engineers, functioning institutions, and growing technological opportunities.

Modern three-dimensional seismic surveys, accelerated drilling, transparent partnerships with technically competent international firms, faster pipeline construction, and systematic redevelopment of abandoned fields could collectively reverse much of today’s decline. None of these measures promises overnight transformation. All require political patience that extends beyond electoral cycles.

Ultimately, Bangladesh’s gas crisis poses a simple but uncomfortable question. Do we intend to manage depletion, or do we intend to manage the future?

History rarely condemns nations because finite resources eventually run out. It judges them for failing to prepare before they did. Bangladesh still has gas beneath its soil. Whether it also retains the political wisdom to recover it may prove to be the most important reserve of all.

(The writer: Academic, Journalist, and Political Analyst based in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Currently he teaches at IUBAT.
He can be reached at nazmulalam.rijohn@gmail.com)