Ukraine’s strategic goal in 2024 is to make Russia’s war felt in Moscow

Al Jazeera :
Ukraine appears to have few resources with which to mount another counteroffensive.
The European Union is upping its military aid from 28 billion euros ($30bn) in the past two years to 21 billion euros ($23bn) this year alone, but that is still not enough to replace United States military aid, stalled in Congress.
The Financial Times reported last month that certain US officials had urged Ukraine to play defence in 2024 and conserve strength for a counteroffensive next year.
“Defensive operations do not necessarily present Ukraine with more opportunities to husband materiel and expand reserves,” wrote the Institute for the Study of War, a Washington-based think tank, in a scathing critique of that advice.
Talking to journalists on Sunday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy hinted that he would appease conservatives with a summit in Switzerland this spring to thrash out a peace proposal.
But he also said, “We believe that it is only right to get stronger on the battlefield … We do not want any negotiation formats or peace formulas to be imposed on us by countries that are not here today, not at war.”
If Ukraine is to fight for a better bargaining position, many experts feel offence is its only choice.
“We are headed towards a war of attrition, which plays into Russia’s hands,” Vienna-based geopolitical strategist Velina Tchakarova told Al Jazeera.
“Ukraine will launch a military offensive – it is clear,” said Tchakarova, who also predicted Russia’s 2022 invasion.
Ukraine has hinted as much.
“We are doing everything possible and impossible to make a breakthrough,” Rustem Umerov, defence minister, said in the past week.
“Plan 2024 is already there. We do not talk about it publicly. It is powerful, it is strong, it gives not only hope but also will give results in 2024,” he said.
Ukraine still aims to restore the borders Russia recognised in 1991, which means pushing Russian forces out of four partially occupied regions – Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia and Kherson – and also retaking Crimea.
A survey for the Munich Security Conference showed that at least three-quarters of Ukrainians still back all of these goals.
Last year’s counteroffensive strategy was to capture Melitopol and reach the Sea of Azov.
From there, Ukrainian forces could cut off Russia from Crimea by firing on the Kerch bridge. Had it succeeded, the strategy would have delivered Crimea, Kherson and most of Zaporizhia, and saddled Russian President Vladimir Putin with enormous political pressure to end the war.
Tchakarova said the 2023 counteroffensive failed because it depended on weapons deliveries from allies.
The Kiel Institute for the World Economy, a think tank, measured that weapons commitments in August-October last year were 87 percent lower than during the same period in 2022, the first year of the war.
“This was the decisive factor that led to no significant breakthroughs on the front lines,” Tchakarova said.
This year, Ukraine plans to make as many of its own weapons as possible.
“We are expecting a lot more [help from allies] if we believe the announcements – F-16s, drones and ammunition,” said Tchakarova. “But I don’t expect any serious support,” underlining the wisdom of Ukraine’s new approach.
Last June’s counteroffensive was based on mechanised manoeuvres and manpower, but its expenditure in weapons and lives proved unsustainable beyond September.
At about the same time, though, Ukraine launched a series of ranged attacks that proved more sustainable and, in some ways, more devastating to Russia.
In May it struck the Kremlin with drones and followed up with more attacks in the heart of Moscow.