August 5, 2024: Bangladesh’s Escape from Orwell’s 1984

How the weaponisation of the Liberation War divided a nation-and why the July generation must be allowed to build a future free from inherited guilt and privilege.
On the night of March 25, 1971, the Pakistan army launched its brutal crackdown on what was then East Pakistan.
Among its targets was the Daily Ittefaq, the newspaper founded by my grandfather, Tofazzal Hossain Manik Miah, which had become a powerful voice for Bengali political rights.
Its premises and printing facilities were attacked and destroyed, taking away what was then my family’s only source of livelihood.
I grew up listening to my parents recount the destruction of Ittefaq, the hardships that followed and the brutality inflicted upon countless families during the Liberation War.
My mother often recalled watching thick plumes of smoke rising over Dhaka from the roof of our family home at 90 Kakrail, unaware at first that the smoke was coming from the Ittefaq building. I can only imagine the anguish of watching a lifetime of work and a family’s livelihood being destroyed before her eyes.
More than half a century later, I sometimes wonder about the Pakistani soldiers who destroyed our newspaper. Many must have grandchildren today, studying at universities, pursuing careers and dreaming of better lives.
Can I blame those grandchildren for what their grandfathers did to my family? Can I hold them responsible for the destruction of our livelihood or crimes committed before they were born? Those who committed atrocities must be held accountable, and history must never forget their crimes. But guilt cannot be inherited.
If I cannot blame the grandchildren of Pakistani soldiers for their ancestors’ actions, how can Bangladesh judge its own citizens by what their grandparents did or did not do in 1971? Conversely, should the grandchildren of freedom fighters inherit privileges unavailable to other citizens simply because of their ancestry? George Orwell warned of precisely this manipulation of history in his dystopian novel 1984.
In Oceania, the ruling Party controlled historical memory, rewrote inconvenient truths and divided citizens between followers of Big Brother and enemies of the state.
Its slogans-“War is Peace”, “Freedom is Slavery” and “Ignorance is Strength”-captured a political order in which truth was subordinate to power.
For many Bangladeshis, Sheikh Hasina’s increasingly authoritarian rule bore an unsettling resemblance to Orwell’s warning.
The Liberation War, which should have remained every citizen’s shared inheritance, became an instrument through which political authority sought to define patriotism.
Bangladesh officially recognizes approximately two hundred thousand freedom fighters. Their sacrifices deserve enduring gratitude, and surviving veterans, particularly those who are wounded, elderly or financially vulnerable, deserve dignified support.
But honoring national heroes is fundamentally different from transforming their sacrifices into hereditary economic and political privilege.
However, freedom fighters did not risk their lives so their grandchildren could receive preferential access to government employment half a century later. Yet the attempt to restore a 30 percent quota for their descendants raised precisely this question.
In a country of roughly 175 million people, how could ancestry linked to approximately 200,000 recognised freedom fighters justify reserving such a substantial share of public employment? The 2024 student protests challenged not only this system but also the principle that patriotism, opportunity and political legitimacy could be inherited.
China’s relationship with Bangladesh illustrates the inconsistencies in our treatment of history. In 1971, Beijing supported Pakistan, opposed Bangladesh’s independence and refused to recognise the new nation until August 31, 1975, after Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s assassination.
Yet China today is one of Bangladesh’s largest trading partners and an important development partner.
Should we reject Chinese investment or blame contemporary Chinese citizens for decisions made by Mao Zedong’s government? Of course not.
A government is not its people, and historical responsibility cannot become permanent collective punishment.
Germany provides another example. Nazi Germany murdered approximately six million Jews during the Holocaust and devastated Europe during World War II. Yet modern Germans do not inherit personal guilt for the crimes of their grandparents.
Germany has confronted its history while reconciling with former enemies. Similarly, the United States declared independence from Great Britain in 1776 and fought a bloody war to secure it; today the two nations are close allies.
Why must Bangladesh remain trapped in divisions dating back more than half a century?
Perhaps the greatest contradiction concerns how Bangladesh’s founding leadership dealt with Pakistan immediately after independence.
Following the surrender on December 16, 1971, approximately 93,000 Pakistani military personnel and associated civilian detainees came into Indian custody.
All were eventually repatriated without being tried for war crimes in Bangladesh, including 195 prisoners specifically identified for prosecution over atrocities committed during the Liberation War.
Under the April 9, 1974 tripartite agreement, Bangladesh agreed not to pursue those trials as an act of clemency and reconciliation.
Not one of the 195 stood trial in Bangladesh. The Geneva Conventions did not require immunity from war-crimes prosecution; this was a diplomatic and political decision.
The contradiction is extraordinary. Men identified for prosecution for atrocities during the Liberation War were released in the name of reconciliation, yet generations of Bangladeshis born long afterward could still be politically stigmatized because of their ancestors’ alleged wartime positions.
On February 22, 1974, Pakistan formally recognized Bangladesh. The following day, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, then prime minister, travelled to Lahore for the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation summit.
Four months later, on June 27, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto arrived in Dhaka at Mujib’s invitation. Sheikh Mujib welcomed him at the airport, and Bhutto received official honours, including a 19-gun salute.

This was barely three years after the genocide. If Bangladesh’s founding leadership could pursue reconciliation with Pakistan’s government so soon after the war, why should reconciliation among Bangladeshis remain politically unacceptable fifty years later? Reconciliation does not require forgetting genocide or abandoning justice; it requires refusing to transmit collective guilt to generations yet unborn.
Even the iconic photograph of Pakistan’s surrender deserves historical context. It shows Lieutenant General A.A.K. Niazi signing the instrument of surrender before India’s Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, who represented the joint Indian and Bangladesh forces.
Yet prominent Bangladeshi Liberation War leaders, most notably General M.A.G. Osmani, Commander-in-Chief of the Bangladesh Forces, were absent from the ceremony.
The principal signatories were Indian and Pakistani generals. India’s decisive military contribution deserves recognition, but the photograph, without proper explanation, can leave the impression that Bangladesh’s liberation was concluded entirely between India and Pakistan.
Then came the economic crises of 1973-74, culminating in the devastating famine of 1974. Some scholarly estimates place the death toll at approximately 1.5 million, although official estimates were considerably lower.
The tragedy became an important subject in Nobel laureate Amartya Sen’s research, which demonstrated that famine can result not simply from insufficient food but from people’s inability to afford it. The catastrophe exposed failures of purchasing power, distribution, administration and public protection.
Yet how prominently is this tragedy taught in our schools? A nation cannot understand its development without examining both the achievements and failures of its founding governments.
Under Hasina, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was increasingly elevated into a personality cult, a demigod, while criticism of the official Liberation War narrative could be portrayed as hostility to the nation.
The term Rajakar, historically associated with collaborators of the Pakistan army, became a contemporary political insult.
During the 2024 quota protests, the suggestion that demonstrators were descendants of collaborators exposed how deeply inherited political guilt had entered public discourse.
Bangladesh’s Gen Z refused to accept this. What began as a demand for fairness in public employment became a broader uprising against repression, inequality and concentrated political power.
According to the United Nations Human Rights Office’s February 2025 investigation, as many as 1,400 people may have been killed during the July-August 2024 crackdown, with thousands more injured.
The UN documented systematic abuses by state institutions and violent elements associated with the ruling party, raising concerns about possible crimes against humanity. Many victims were students and young people demanding dignity and accountability.

There is a powerful historical resonance. In 1952, few students died defending the recognition of Bangla, helping inspire the struggle that eventually produced an independent Bangladesh. In 2024, another generation confronted state violence demanding equality and political freedom.
The circumstances differed, but both demonstrated the power of young people to challenge injustice.
On August 5, 2024, Sheikh Hasina’s government fell.
The following day, India’s External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar, informed the Indian Parliament that, following a meeting with Bangladesh’s security leadership, Hasina had apparently decided to resign.
He confirmed that she had requested permission to travel to India at very short notice and that the Bangladesh authorities had sought flight clearance for her departure. She arrived in Delhi that evening, on August 5.
For Bangladesh, the day symbolized the end of an Orwellian political era in which the state had increasingly claimed the authority to define patriotism, control national memory and punish dissent.
Yet the collapse of an authoritarian government does not automatically dismantle the system that sustained it.
The July National Charter, signed in October 2025, and the subsequent February 2026 referendum on constitutional reforms offered an opportunity to translate the uprising into independent institutions, accountable governance, constitutional safeguards and equal citizenship.
The danger is that one political elite merely replaces another while inherited privilege and authoritarian structures survive.
Consider who sustains the country today. During FY 2025-26, overseas Bangladeshis sent home approximately $35.6 billion in remittances, one of the nation’s most important sources of foreign exchange.
These workers labour across construction sites, factories, hospitals and service industries, often spending years separated from their families.
They earn dollars, riyals and dirhams while their families receive Bangladeshi taka. During Hasina’s rule, the taka weakened from roughly 69 to 118 per US dollar, losing more than 40 percent of its dollar value while households faced rising import prices and living costs.
These migrant workers contribute enormously to the nation’s financial resilience without claiming hereditary privileges for their descendants.
Yet too many leave Bangladesh with limited language skills, inadequate training and qualifications that command relatively low wages internationally.
Meanwhile, educated young Bangladeshis struggle with unemployment, underemployment and a persistent mismatch between education and opportunity.
Considering the underlying circumstances, Bangladesh must create a population capable of competing globally.
Already a major exporter of labour, Bangladesh should become a major exporter of skilled human capital.
Internationally recognized qualifications in engineering, healthcare, industrial automation, logistics, construction technology, artificial intelligence and digital services could transform both migrant earnings and domestic productivity.
A worker earning $500 monthly might qualify for a $1,500 position through additional skills and certification.
Universities should prepare graduates for global professional employment, including remote opportunities, while English proficiency, digital literacy, vocational education and apprenticeships become national priorities.
The rearview mirror is essential when driving. It reminds us of where we have been and of dangers we must remember.Bangladesh cannot move forward by constantly looking in the rearview mirror.
As a manpower-exporting powerhouse, Bangladesh must prepare its youth for a future in which opportunities increasingly transcend national borders.
We must equip our population with the right communication skills, technical expertise and soft skills to compete and thrive in an increasingly interconnected global market for talent.
George Orwell’s 1984 should become essential reading in our schools and universities, offering a warning against propaganda, manipulated history, personality cults and concentrated political power.
Our children must learn to examine evidence, question authority and distinguish patriotism from loyalty of our political leaders.


