Israel, Türkiye and Palestine: A Middle East at a Dangerous Crossroads
The Middle East is entering another uncertain and dangerous phase. The conflict over Palestine has already reshaped regional politics, while relations between Israel and Türkiye have deteriorated sharply.
What was once a relationship involving military and economic cooperation has increasingly become one of political confrontation.
The tension was visible during the 2026 United Nations General Assembly.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan strongly criticised Israel’s conduct in Gaza, urged wider recognition of Palestine and called for reform of the UN Security Council.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in his UN address, sharply criticised Israel’s opponents and specifically targeted Türkiye and Qatar.
Some analysts have consequently raised the possibility of a future military confrontation between Israel and Türkiye. Such a possibility should not be dismissed, but neither should it be considered inevitable.
The immediate danger is less a deliberate decision by either country to start a war than the possibility of military miscalculation, particularly in Syria.
Why Israel and Türkiye Are Moving Apart
The principal source of disagreement is Gaza. Türkiye has become one of Israel’s strongest critics since the beginning of the Gaza war.
Ankara has demanded an end to Israeli military operations and greater international pressure for Palestinian statehood. Israel, meanwhile, rejects allegations that its actions constitute genocide.
The strategic disagreement extends beyond Gaza. Syria has become an increasingly important arena of competition.
Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government, Türkiye has sought considerable influence over Syria’s future, while Israel wants to prevent hostile military forces from establishing positions close to its borders.
This creates the possibility of Israeli and Turkish forces operating within the same strategic environment. In August, Israel struck the Abu al-Duhur airbase in Syria. Syrian officials subsequently said there had been no intention to establish a permanent Turkish military presence there.
Nevertheless, the incident highlighted the potential for misunderstanding between Israel and Türkiye.
A military incident involving Turkish and Israeli forces could create political pressure for retaliation even if neither government initially wanted a war.
Is an Israel–Türkiye War Possible?
A direct war would be extremely costly for both countries. Türkiye is a NATO member with extensive economic and diplomatic relationships with Europe and the United States. Israel has a longstanding strategic relationship with Washington.
A confrontation between the two would therefore create consequences far beyond their bilateral relationship.
Both countries have reasons to avoid such a conflict. Türkiye can pursue its Palestinian policy through diplomacy, economic pressure and international institutions. Israel can pursue its security objectives in Syria without necessarily confronting Türkiye directly.
The principal danger is uncontrolled escalation. An Israeli strike that kills Turkish personnel, a Turkish response against Israeli forces, or an incident involving aircraft or military installations in Syria could rapidly transform political hostility into a wider security crisis.
A permanent Israel–Türkiye military deconfliction mechanism for Syria would therefore be highly desirable. The United States, NATO or the United Nations could help maintain communication channels and prevent individual incidents from escalating.
Palestine Remains the Central Question
Behind the wider regional tension lies the unresolved Palestinian question.
The October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent Israeli military campaign in Gaza produced enormous destruction and loss of life.
By late September 2026, the Palestinian death toll reported by Gaza’s Health Ministry had exceeded 74,000, while more than 175,000 people had reportedly been wounded.
Although a ceasefire has been in place since October 2025, the United Nations reports that Israeli strikes and other violence have continued.
The humanitarian crisis is accompanied by a profound political crisis. The United Nations has reported that settlement expansion, settler violence, displacement and movement restrictions in the West Bank continue to undermine the possibility of a viable Palestinian state.
The UN Secretary-General has warned that the conditions necessary for an independent, contiguous and sovereign Palestinian state are being progressively eroded.
This creates the central contradiction of the present situation: the international community continues to support a two-state settlement, while developments on the ground are making such a settlement increasingly difficult.
Gaza Cannot Be Separated from Political Settlement
Rebuilding Gaza is urgently necessary, but reconstruction alone cannot produce peace.
A joint assessment by the European Union, United Nations and World Bank estimated Gaza’s recovery and reconstruction requirements at $26.3 billion during the first 18 months.
More than 371,000 housing units were assessed as destroyed or damaged, while more than half of Gaza’s hospitals were reported to be non-functional.
But reconstruction raises fundamental political questions. Who will govern Gaza? What security arrangements will exist? How will Gaza relate to the West Bank? What will be the political future of the Palestinians?
These questions cannot be postponed. The UN position is that Gaza and the West Bank should ultimately be reunited under a legitimate Palestinian government and that reconstruction should proceed alongside a credible political pathway toward Palestinian self-determination.
A Rational Path Toward Peace
A realistic solution requires several measures to proceed together.
First, the ceasefire must become genuinely durable. A reduction in large-scale hostilities cannot by itself be considered lasting peace.
A reliable monitoring mechanism, with clear procedures for investigating and preventing violations, is necessary.
Second, Gaza and the West Bank should remain politically and territorially connected. A permanently isolated Gaza would make the establishment of a viable Palestinian state considerably more difficult. Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem should ultimately form part of a coherent Palestinian political and economic space.
Third, Palestinian institutions must be strengthened and reformed. A future Palestinian state requires effective administration, financial stability, public accountability and legitimate political representation. The Palestinian Authority’s continuing fiscal and institutional difficulties require international attention.
Fourth, Israel’s security concerns must be addressed. Israel has a legitimate interest in protecting its population from armed attacks. But long-term security cannot depend indefinitely on military control over Palestinian territory.
Security and Palestinian self-determination should be treated as complementary rather than mutually exclusive objectives.
Fifth, borders and settlements must be addressed directly. The internationally supported framework remains a two-state settlement based on the pre-1967 lines, with mutually agreed adjustments and Jerusalem serving as the capital of both states.
Sixth, Türkiye should be part of the diplomatic solution. Türkiye has considerable influence in the Muslim world and has participated in diplomacy concerning Gaza.
At the same time, Israel has serious concerns about Turkish activity in Syria. Instead of allowing these disagreements to develop into military confrontation, the two countries should establish a direct crisis-management channel, particularly concerning Syria.
Peace will require compromise, credible international guarantees and political courage from all sides. Another war in the Middle East would only deepen the region’s humanitarian and political crises.
The rational alternative is to prevent escalation, restore meaningful diplomacy and pursue a political settlement that provides security for Israel and self-determination for the Palestinians.
(The author is a political analyst and Advisory Editor of The New Nation)
