BRICS’s New Journey: Dollar Dominance, Global Politics, and Bangladesh’s Emerging Choices
The 18th BRICS Summit, held in New Delhi on September 12–13, has once again drawn attention to a changing global order.
The grouping, which began with Brazil, Russia, India and China and later included South Africa and new members from the Global South, now represents a substantial share of the world’s population and economic activity.
Its latest summit produced the New Delhi Declaration, covering trade, investment, development finance, technology, agriculture, health, artificial intelligence, global governance and cross-border payments.
Yet the real importance of the summit lies not in the number of proposals adopted but in whether they can be translated into effective institutions and practical cooperation.
The central question is therefore: How much of the BRICS agenda can actually be implemented and what could it mean for the existing world economic order?
From Declarations to Implementation
BRICS has made ambitious declarations before. Its most tangible achievement has been the New Development Bank, which has financed development projects and provided an institutional alternative to traditional Western-led sources of development finance.
BRICS has also spent years discussing greater use of local currencies and more efficient cross-border payment mechanisms.
The New Delhi Summit continued this process. But expectations should remain realistic.
The leaders did not establish a common BRICS currency. Nor did they approve a fully operational alternative payment system capable of immediately challenging the global dollar-based financial architecture. India itself has made clear that there is currently no proposal for a common BRICS currency.
Indeed, reports from the summit indicate that the declaration merely acknowledged the work of the BRICS Payment Task Force rather than endorsing a concrete implementation plan for an integrated payment system.
This distinction is important. BRICS may be moving toward reducing dependence on the dollar rather than replacing the dollar.
Can BRICS Seriously Challenge the Dollar?
The dollar’s dominance is deeply rooted. It is supported by the size and strength of the US economy, the depth and liquidity of American financial markets, the dollar’s extensive use in international trade and finance, and the credibility of institutions built around the US-led financial system.
Therefore, it would be unrealistic to suggest that the New Delhi Summit marks the beginning of the end of American financial dominance.
Nevertheless, something important is happening.
If BRICS members increasingly settle bilateral trade in their own currencies, develop interoperable payment systems and expand financial cooperation through institutions such as the New Development Bank, they can gradually reduce their exposure to dollar-related risks.
That could weaken the relative influence of the dollar without eliminating its central role.
The distinction matters. A world in which the dollar remains dominant but faces growing competition from the yuan, euro and other currencies would be very different from a world in which the dollar disappears as the principal international reserve and transaction currency.
BRICS appears to be pursuing the former rather than the latter.
The Internal Contradictions of BRICS
BRICS’s strength is also its weakness. It brings together countries with very different economic structures, political systems and strategic interests.
China and India, for example, have substantial economic relations but remain strategic competitors.
India wants greater financial autonomy but is unlikely to accept an arrangement that simply replaces dependence on Washington with dependence on Beijing.
China, meanwhile, possesses much greater financial and technological capacity than most other BRICS members.
The expansion of the grouping has increased its global weight, but it has also made consensus more difficult.
The differences between Iran and the United Arab Emirates, for example, illustrate the difficulty of maintaining a common position on major geopolitical issues.
Consequently, BRICS is unlikely to become a tightly integrated bloc comparable to the European Union. Its more realistic future is that of a flexible coalition of emerging powers seeking greater influence in global economic and political decision-making.
What Does It Mean for Non-Members?
The consequences will extend well beyond BRICS itself.
For developing countries outside the grouping, the emergence of additional sources of finance and payment mechanisms could be beneficial.
If BRICS institutions offer competitive development finance, easier local-currency settlement and alternative channels for trade and investment, countries will have greater room for manoeuvre.
This could increase their bargaining power with both Western and non-Western powers.
What Should Bangladesh Do?
For Bangladesh, the changing BRICS landscape deserves serious attention.
Bangladesh is already a member of the New Development Bank, giving it access to an additional source of development finance.
The country could potentially benefit from BRICS-related cooperation in infrastructure, energy, transportation, environmental projects, technology and trade.
But membership in an institution is not enough. Bangladesh needs a coherent strategy for using these opportunities without damaging its relationships with other major partners.
The United States and European Union remain critically important to Bangladesh’s export economy. China is a major trading and investment partner.
India is Bangladesh’s most important immediate neighbour. Japan and the Middle Eastern countries are also significant sources of investment, employment and economic cooperation.
Bangladesh therefore cannot afford a foreign policy based on choosing one camp against another.
Its best course is strategic balance, economic pragmatism and diversified diplomacy.
Implications for Bangladesh’s Politics
The rise of BRICS may also influence Bangladesh’s domestic political debate.
Foreign policy is increasingly connected with domestic economic priorities. Questions concerning investment, trade, energy security, infrastructure, defence cooperation and access to international finance inevitably affect political choices.
Bangladesh’s political parties may increasingly debate whether the country should remain closely connected with Western economic and strategic structures or move closer to emerging powers such as China and other BRICS members.
That debate should not become an ideological contest.
The correct question should be: Which policy best serves Bangladesh’s national interests?
Bangladesh should cooperate with Washington when such cooperation serves its interests, deepen economic engagement with Beijing when that is beneficial, maintain constructive relations with New Delhi, and explore opportunities with BRICS institutions without sacrificing its wider international partnerships.
Such an approach would give Bangladesh greater diplomatic flexibility at a time when the global balance of power is becoming increasingly complicated.
A New World, Not a New Master
The New Delhi BRICS Summit should neither be portrayed as a revolution that will overthrow the existing world order nor dismissed as another diplomatic gathering producing declarations without consequences.
Its significance lies in a longer process.
BRICS is helping to create alternative channels of finance, trade and international cooperation. These initiatives may gradually reduce the ability of any single power to dominate the global economic system. But the process will be slow, complicated and uneven.
The dollar is not about to disappear. Nor is BRICS about to become a unified economic superpower. The more plausible future is a multipolar financial system in which the dollar remains powerful but faces increasing competition and where developing countries have more alternatives than they have today.
For Bangladesh, the message is clear: the country should seek neither a Western camp nor a BRICS camp. It should seek Bangladesh’s camp—one defined by national interest, economic opportunity, strategic autonomy and balanced relations with all major powers.
The future success of BRICS will depend on whether it can convert declarations into functioning institutions. The future success of Bangladesh will depend on whether its political leadership can understand this changing world early enough—and turn that change into an opportunity rather than a new source of dependency.
(The writer is the Advisory Editor, The New Nation)
