From Indus to Ganges Why Bangladesh Must Rethink Its Water Security?

H. M. Nazmul Alam :

When India recently announced the suspension of the historic Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan, the world’s attention was immediately drawn to the alarming escalation between two nuclear-armed neighbours. Yet beyond the predictable India-Pakistan tensions, this move has wider, far more dangerous implications for the entire South Asian region.

For Bangladesh — a country heavily dependent on transboundary rivers originating in India — the decision rings a loud and urgent alarm. If India can weaponize water against Pakistan today, there is no guarantee it will not use similar tactics against Bangladesh tomorrow.

The Indus Waters Treaty, signed in 1960 under the auspices of the World Bank, has long been hailed as a model for successful conflict resolution over shared rivers. It allocated control of three eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) to India, while reserving the waters of three western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) for Pakistan. Despite wars, skirmishes, and political crises, the treaty survived — testament to the critical importance of water security transcending even the deepest hostilities.

However, with its abrupt suspension, India has torn up decades of precedent, sending a clear message: in the new geopolitical reality, even lifelines like water can be weaponized. The suspension allows India to stop providing flood data to Pakistan, cease consultations on hydropower projects, and theoretically, halt or divert flows during critical periods — particularly the dry season, when water is most precious. Although India currently lacks the reservoir infrastructure to instantly block massive river flows, the precedent has been set. Infrastructure can be built. Strategies can change.

For Bangladesh, this is not a theoretical risk. It is an immediate and existential one. Over 90 percent of Bangladesh’s surface water originates outside its borders, primarily from India. The Ganges, Brahmaputra, Teesta, and Meghna rivers are the arteries of Bangladesh’s agrarian economy and ecological health. If upstream India were to manipulate water flows — whether by damming, diversion, or simply withholding critical flood information — Bangladesh would face catastrophic consequences.

The Farakka Barrage offers a historical lesson. Operational since 1975, Farakka was built to divert Ganges water into India’s Hooghly River to flush out silt and maintain navigability at Kolkata port.

In practice, it drastically reduced dry-season flows into Bangladesh’s southwestern region, leading to desertification, riverbed siltation, depletion of fisheries, and mass displacement. Despite multiple agreements — including the 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty — the dry-season flows remain inadequate, and Bangladesh’s southwestern districts continue to suffer.

Moreover, the ongoing deadlock over the Teesta River has further soured relations. For more than a decade, Bangladesh has awaited the signing of a water-sharing agreement for the Teesta. Political commitments were made — including promises by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi — but domestic opposition within India, particularly from West Bengal’s government, has stalled progress. Meanwhile, India has continued expanding irrigation canals and projects along the Teesta, severely impacting water availability during Bangladesh’s crucial Boro rice cultivation period.

Given this track record, Dhaka can no longer assume that cordial diplomatic ties will translate into guaranteed water rights. Relations between Bangladesh and India, while officially described as historic and warm, have come under strain over several issues, including India’s controversial Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and the National Register of Citizens (NRC) exercise in Assam, which threatened to push undocumented “illegal migrants” into Bangladesh. Growing incidents of border killings by India’s Border Security Force (BSF) have further eroded public trust in India’s intentions.

In this context, India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty represents a watershed moment — punishing Pakistan today, perhaps, but laying down a strategic principle that could be applied elsewhere tomorrow. The weaponization of water is now part of South Asia’s political toolkit.
Bangladesh must treat this development with the seriousness it demands. In a future conflict or diplomatic standoff, water could easily be leveraged as a tool of coercion.

Even without overt hostilities, upstream control could be used subtly — through manipulation of seasonal flows, delays in flood warnings, or “accidental” dam discharges causing downstream flooding during the monsoon.

What then should Bangladesh do? First and foremost, Dhaka must elevate water security to the highest levels of national strategy — treating it with the same urgency accorded to defense or food security. Future water-sharing agreements must be legally binding, internationally guaranteed, and based on equitable and reasonable utilization principles enshrined in international law. Bangladesh must push for tripartite or multilateral negotiations where possible, involving Nepal, Bhutan, and even China to counterbalance India’s upstream dominance.

Secondly, Bangladesh must invest heavily in domestic water resilience. Rainwater harvesting, groundwater recharge, river dredging, and conservation agriculture must become national priorities. Cities must move toward wastewater recycling and better urban water management. Coastal regions, already facing salinity intrusion, need urgent attention in terms of alternative water sourcing and climate-adaptive infrastructure.

Thirdly, Dhaka must diversify its diplomatic strategies. While maintaining good relations with India remains crucial, Bangladesh should simultaneously deepen its strategic engagements with other South Asian countries and major global powers to build diplomatic leverage. Alignments with regional initiatives focusing on river basin management, like those led by China or international bodies like the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, could offer additional platforms for advocacy.

Fourthly, Bangladesh must build national capacity for independent hydrological data gathering. Satellite monitoring, river flow measurement stations, and indigenous flood modeling systems must be developed to reduce reliance on upstream countries’ data, which can be weaponized during tensions.

Finally, there must be a broad national awakening to the dangers ahead. Water security cannot remain an issue confined to technocrats and diplomats. It must become part of the national consciousness. Universities, civil society, and the media must mobilize public opinion and hold policymakers accountable for proactive action.

The suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty marks a dangerous new era in South Asia’s geopolitics. Bangladesh, perhaps more than any other country in the region, stands exposed. Our rivers have nourished our fields, filled our wetlands, and shaped our civilization. If we lose control over their flows, we risk losing far more than crops or energy — we risk losing sovereignty itself.

Water is now a weapon. Bangladesh must prepare accordingly — with wisdom, foresight, and unyielding determination. The stakes could not be higher. The time to act is now.

(The writer is a Lecturer, Department of English and Modern Languages, International University of Business Agriculture and Technology (IUBAT), Academic, Journalist, and Political Analyst based in Dhaka. He can be reached at [email protected])