Bangladesh’s Arakan Army dilemma

Dr. Azeem Ibrahim :

The surprising ascendancy of the Arakan Army in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, with the group now controlling the entire 271-km border with Bangladesh, has shaken the regional status quo. For Bangladesh, this development is not merely a foreign policy puzzle, it is a national security and humanitarian crisis rolled into one. Yet, as the Arakan Army consolidates its grip on Rakhine, Dhaka remains indecisive, sticking to outdated strategies that have repeatedly failed. It is high time for Bangladesh to pivot and formulate a nuanced policy that reflects the new realities on the ground.
Historically, Dhaka’s approach to Myanmar has centered on engaging with its central government, including the junta that orchestrated the Rohingya genocide. This reliance on Naypyitaw has been fraught with miscalculations. The military regime’s lack of genuine interest in resolving the Rohingya crisis has been evident in its repeated failures to honor agreements for repatriation. For years, Dhaka has tried to negotiate with a regime that not only expelled more than 730,000 Rohingya but has also shown no inclination to create the conditions for their safe return.
The Arakan Army’s rise fundamentally changes the landscape. As the de facto authority in much of Rakhine, the group has captured key military outposts, including the Western Regional Command headquarters at Ann, making the Myanmar military’s hold over the region increasingly tenuous. The group’s control over the border directly impacts Bangladesh, influencing cross-border security, refugee flows and the potential for humanitarian aid delivery.
Yet Dhaka’s response has been underwhelming. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mohammed Rafiqul Alam recently reiterated Bangladesh’s commitment to border security and declined to comment on engaging with nonstate actors like the Arakan Army. While this position aligns with traditional diplomatic norms, it falls short of addressing the complexities introduced by the group’s dominance.
One of Dhaka’s critical mistakes has been assuming that playing safe by sticking to conventional state-to-state diplomacy is the most prudent course. However, this approach overlooks the fact that Myanmar’s junta has little incentive to engage in meaningful negotiations. The military’s recent actions, including escalated violence involving beheadings, rape and torture, as reported by UN experts, underscore its indifference to international norms and humanitarian concerns.
In contrast, the Arakan Army, despite its designation as a nonstate actor, has demonstrated a willingness to govern and negotiate. The group’s leadership has indicated a vision for an inclusive Rakhine that incorporates both Buddhist Rakhine and Muslim populations, including the Rohingya. While these statements need to be scrutinized for genuine intent, they present an opening for dialogue that did not exist with the junta. Engaging with the Arakan Army could offer Bangladesh a pragmatic path forward, particularly in addressing the Rohingya crisis.
However, engaging with the Arakan Army is not without risks. The group’s ultimate political goals remain fluid. While it currently seeks greater autonomy within Myanmar, its rhetoric occasionally hints at aspirations for full independence. Moreover, there are unresolved tensions between it and the Rohingya population, which could complicate efforts to facilitate the refugees’ safe return. Any dialogue with the group must prioritize the protection of Rohingya rights and ensure that they are not sidelined in the Arakan Army’s governance framework.
Bangladesh must also navigate the geopolitical implications of engaging with a nonstate actor. Such a move could strain its relationships with regional powers like China and India, both of which have vested interests in Myanmar. Dhaka must work diplomatically to ensure that its engagement with the Arakan Army does not alienate these key players. Coordinating with international partners and leveraging multilateral platforms could help Bangladesh manage these complexities.
Additionally, Dhaka should adopt a multifaceted strategy that goes beyond direct engagement with the group. This includes strengthening border security to prevent further influxes of refugees and arms smuggling, while also ensuring that humanitarian aid reaches affected populations in Rakhine. Bangladesh could also push for international recognition of the Arakan Army’s governance in Rakhine, potentially opening avenues for third-party mediation and conflict resolution.
The humanitarian dimension cannot be ignored. The continued displacement of Rohingya refugees, exacerbated by the Arakan Army-junta conflict, has led to overcrowded camps in Bangladesh, where resources are stretched thin. The international community’s dwindling aid commitments further compound the crisis. Bangladesh must use the group’s rise as leverage to demand increased global support for both immediate relief and long-term solutions.
The Arakan Army’s control over the Bangladesh-Myanmar border marks a seismic shift in regional geopolitics. For Dhaka, the status quo of engaging solely with Myanmar’s central government is no longer viable. By recognizing the Arakan Army’s de facto authority and adopting a flexible, pragmatic approach, Bangladesh can better safeguard its national interests and contribute to regional stability. This will require courage, creativity and a willingness to break from conventional diplomatic playbooks. The cost of inaction is too high, both for Bangladesh and the countless Rohingya whose futures hang in the balance.

(The author is the director of special initiatives at the Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy in Washington, DC.
Courtesy: Arab News).