Commentary: What can be more important than Rooppur Nuclear Power Project now?

Bangladesh today finds itself at the mercy of forces far beyond its borders.

The escalating tensions involving the United States, Israel, and Iran — and the resulting instability in the Strait of Hormuz — have once again exposed a fundamental vulnerability in our energy system.

A significant portion of our electricity depends on imported fuels that must pass through some of the world’s most geopolitically sensitive routes.

 The consequences are already visible. Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) prices have doubled since the onset of the conflict, and spot LNG prices have surged sharply in recent weeks, according to international reporting.

But more detrimental to Bangladesh’s economy than rising prices alone is the increasing volatility of both prices and availability of these fuels.

When supply chains are disrupted and prices swing unpredictably, planning becomes impossible — for government, industry, and investors alike. For a growing economy, this uncertainty is as damaging as the cost itself.

This is precisely why the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant is not just another infrastructure project. It is the single most important strategic energy investment Bangladesh has undertaken.

Unlike LNG or oil-based generation, nuclear energy provides stable, continuous, and predictable power.

It is not exposed to daily price volatility or shipping disruptions. Nuclear fuel is compact, can be stockpiled, and operates under long-term contractual arrangements.

In a world increasingly defined by supply shocks and geopolitical uncertainty, Rooppur offers something invaluable; insulation.

At full capacity, the plant will deliver 2,400 megawatts of baseload electricity — power that runs 24 hours a day, regardless of weather or fuel shipping conditions.

This is critical for an economy that is industrializing rapidly and increasingly dependent on uninterrupted electricity for manufacturing, services, and emerging sectors such as data centres.

The economics are equally compelling. Electricity from Rooppur is expected to cost in the range of Tk 8 to Tk 10 per kilowatt-hour, roughly half the cost of generation from HFO-based plants at current fuel prices.

At full capacity, the plant could save Bangladesh approximately $2.8 billion annually in fuel costs alone. These are not marginal gains; they are transformational.

It is important to emphasize that neither nuclear power nor transmission technology is new or experimental.

The first nuclear power plant in Switzerland began operating 57 years ago and continues to function today.

High-voltage transmission systems have been in use for more than a century, and river-crossing transmission lines have been engineered for decades across the world.

The persistent delays in Rooppur, therefore, cannot credibly be attributed to technological complexity.

The real issues lie elsewhere: in execution, coordination, financing disruptions, and the performance of contractors.

The most visible bottleneck has been the 16-kilometre river-crossing transmission line required to evacuate power from the plant, spanning the Padma and Jamuna rivers.

The contract was awarded to India’s Transrail Lighting Limited. Initially tied to Indian financing, the arrangement later unraveled.

Following the political upheaval in Bangladesh in July 2024, foreign workers associated with the contractor reportedly declined to return, citing security concerns. As a result, progress slowed significantly.

At the same time, Rosatom, the Russian state-owned company responsible for the nuclear plant itself, has faced constraints in conducting key system readiness tests due to the incomplete state of the grid.

In effect, a completed or near-completed power plant is waiting for the transmission system to catch up.
This is not a failure of engineering. It is a failure of delivery.

There is also an uncomfortable reality that must be acknowledged.

The project has, by many accounts, become a corruption-prone cash cow for some stakeholders, with costs escalating to an estimated $14 billion, more than twice the cost of comparable nuclear projects in India on a per-unit basis.

Whether due to inefficiencies, opaque procurement or governance lapses, the financial burden is now locked in.

But that is precisely the point: this is a sunk cost.

Bangladesh is obligated to repay the project’s debt — along with interest — regardless of whether the plant is fully operational.

Every month of delay effectively means paying for an asset that is not generating its full economic value. In that sense, inaction is not neutral — it is expensive.

This makes the case for accelerated commissioning not just logical, but urgent. The faster the plant reaches full capacity, the sooner it begins offsetting costly fuel imports and generating returns on the capital already committed.

Bangladesh must now confront this reality with urgency and clarity. The technologies involved are mature. The benefits are undeniable. The delays are avoidable.

The government’s approach going forward must be simple and uncompromising: if a contractor cannot deliver, alternatives must be found — quickly.

Whether that means enforcing stricter performance guarantees, bringing in additional contractors, or restructuring project execution, the priority must be completion, not process.

Most importantly, the government must accelerate all remaining work to ensure that Rooppur begins at least partial power generation before December of this year.

Even limited output would begin easing fuel imports, stabilizing the grid, and signaling progress to both markets and citizens.

The broader energy context makes this imperative even more urgent. Renewable energy, while important, cannot yet substitute for baseload power in Bangladesh.

Solar generation, for instance, requires roughly three acres per megawatt and produces electricity for only a few effective hours per day.

Crucially, it produces nothing during the evening peak, when demand is highest.

Industrial operations and digital infrastructure require uninterrupted, round-the-clock power — something only baseload sources such as nuclear and gas can provide at scale.

Modern power systems also require stability — frequency control and grid inertia — which nuclear plants are uniquely positioned to provide. Without such anchors, the grid becomes more fragile, not less.

Looking ahead, Bangladesh must also begin contemplating expanding nuclear capacity beyond Rooppur, particularly through small modular reactors (SMRs).

As electricity demand evolves — driven by urbanization, industrial growth, and the gradual adoption of electric vehicles — the need for reliable, distributed, and scalable baseload power will only increase.

SMRs offer a flexible pathway to add capacity incrementally while maintaining grid stability.

The current timeline targets a test run of Rooppur’s first unit in April this year, full operation of its 1,200 MW capacity by the end of the year, and full 2,400 MW output by 2027. These milestones must be treated not as aspirational goals, but as national priorities.

Rooppur is more than a power plant. It is Bangladesh’s hedge against a volatile world. It is a foundation for industrial growth. It is, in a very real sense, an instrument of economic sovereignty.

At a time when global energy routes are uncertain and fuel prices are unpredictable, Bangladesh cannot afford delay.

The cost is no longer measured in taka or dollars — it is measured in vulnerability.

Rooppur must be completed. And it must be completed now.