From Xiong’an to the World: Can Global Governance Become Fairer for All?

The time has come for world leaders to confront a fundamental question: how can global governance ensure that every country, large or small, enjoys sovereign equality and the freedom to pursue its own development? In a world shaped by geopolitical rivalry, economic uncertainty and technological change, international cooperation must serve the interests of all nations, not merely those with the greatest economic and military power.

International law should protect every country equally, while multilateral institutions should enable nations to shape common rules rather than simply accept decisions made by the powerful. The challenge is not only to expand global prosperity but also to ensure that its benefits are shared more fairly.

It was against this backdrop that Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed the Global Governance Initiative (GGI) at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Plus meeting in Tianjin on 1 September 2025. The initiative calls for a more just and equitable international order, guided by five principles: sovereign equality, the international rule of law, multilateralism, a people-centred approach and practical actions. China presents the GGI as an effort to reform existing institutions rather than replace the international system centred on the United Nations.

The debate returned to the forefront at the Global Governance Forum held in Xiong’an New Area, Hebei Province, from 23 to 25 October 2026. Nearly 400 representatives from more than 90 countries and international organisations gathered under the theme “Rebuilding Confidence and Cooperation: Reforming and Improving Global Governance in a Transforming World”. The forum marked the GGI’s first anniversary and provided an opportunity to consider whether its principles could translate into institutional change.

The international order established after the Second World War (1939-1945) has made significant contributions to peace, development and cooperation. The United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions remain essential to international relations. Yet the distribution of influence within these institutions has not kept pace with changes in the global economy.
Emerging economies now play a greater role in trade and production, while developing countries are demanding a stronger voice in decisions affecting their futures. Climate change, artificial intelligence, pandemics, cyber insecurity and financial instability have further exposed the limitations of fragmented international responses.

For the Global South, these imbalances have practical consequences. They influence access to development finance, debt relief, technology, export markets and climate funding. Countries may enjoy sovereignty in law while finding their economic choices constrained by decisions made elsewhere.

The challenge, however, is to reform the system without simply transferring dominance from one group of powerful states to another. China has identified nine priority areas for global governance reform, including the United Nations and its Security Council, peacekeeping, development, human rights, international economic and financial governance, artificial intelligence, cyberspace, outer space and exchanges among civilisations. These priorities address genuine governance gaps, but identifying problems is easier than building international agreement on solutions.

Consider Security Council reform. Its permanent membership reflects the geopolitical settlement of 1945, while today’s international community includes influential countries and regional groupings that remain underrepresented. Yet reform requires agreement on difficult questions: which countries should gain permanent representation, whether new members should have veto powers, and whether existing veto rights should be restricted.

Under Article 108 of the UN Charter, amendments require approval by two-thirds of the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of UN members, including all five permanent Security Council members. Any meaningful reform must therefore confront the interests of those who already hold power.

The same challenge applies to international financial governance. Developing countries need a stronger voice in decisions on lending, debt sustainability and access to capital. But representation alone will not resolve their problems unless reforms also improve financing conditions and make resources more accessible.

At the Xiong’an forum, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced eight practical actions, including continued engagement in UN reform, cooperation on marine biodiversity, initiatives on human rights and outer-space governance, an assessment of artificial intelligence capacity-building, and the establishment of a Global Governance Research Centre to publish annual reports and a Global Governance Index. These proposals could contribute to more effective international cooperation, but their value will depend on what they deliver.

A governance index, for instance, could help measure whether institutions are becoming more representative and responsive. To command international confidence, however, its methodology, indicators and evidence must be transparent. It should measure outcomes rather than simply count endorsements or declarations.

Similarly, cooperation on artificial intelligence should enable developing countries to acquire expertise, build digital infrastructure and participate in setting international standards. Otherwise, new governance arrangements could leave technological power concentrated in the same countries that already dominate the field.

The forum produced the consensus document Global Governance: Xiong’an Vision (2026), while Chinese officials reported that more than 160 countries and international organisations had expressed support for the GGI and that over 60 countries had joined the Group of Friends of Global Governance. These figures indicate growing diplomatic interest, but support for general principles does not necessarily mean agreement on specific reforms.

Countries may endorse sovereign equality while disagreeing over human rights, security, trade and technology governance. The real test is whether governments will negotiate workable rules, commit resources and accept scrutiny of their implementation.

China’s own role deserves the same examination. The GGI is part of China’s wider diplomatic agenda, alongside its Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative and Global Civilisation Initiative. These initiatives address different dimensions of international cooperation, but their effectiveness should be judged by their contribution to universal institutions and collective problem-solving.

China can help correct longstanding imbalances while pursuing its national interests. These objectives are not necessarily incompatible. Nevertheless, the GGI will have greater international credibility if participating countries can shape its priorities and implementation collectively, rather than merely endorse a framework proposed by Beijing. The same standard should apply to every major power.

Nor should the Global South be treated as a single, unified bloc. Bangladesh, India, Brazil, South Africa and vulnerable island states have different economic interests and diplomatic priorities. Building a fairer order requires developing countries not only to demand greater representation but also to cooperate on common objectives.

For Bangladesh, global governance reform has direct implications for development finance, climate resilience, trade and technological progress. Dhaka should work with other developing countries to pursue more accessible climate finance, sustainable borrowing arrangements and fairer representation in international financial institutions. It should also seek practical cooperation on artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure and skills development.

Such diplomacy must be issue-based rather than driven by geopolitical alignment. Bangladesh should engage China and other major powers wherever cooperation advances its national interests, while retaining the freedom to assess each proposal on its merits. Its objective should be to expand economic and diplomatic choices, not replace one form of dependence with another.

The next phase of the GGI should therefore focus on three priorities. First, each reform proposal needs measurable objectives, clear indicators and realistic timetables. Second, proposals must enter the formal negotiating processes of the United Nations and other relevant institutions, where compromise is essential. Third, major powers must demonstrate that they are prepared to accept the same international standards they advocate for others.

The United Nations must remain central to this process. Its limitations are real, but weakening the principal universal forum would make it harder for smaller countries to defend their interests. Reform should strengthen its capacity to act while making its institutions more representative and accountable.
Ultimately, the significance of Xi Jinping’s Global Governance Initiative will not be determined by how many countries endorse it, but by whether it helps translate demands for fairness into workable reforms and tangible benefits.

The gathering in Xiong’an has renewed an important debate. Its lasting contribution will depend on what happens after the delegates return home: whether governments change their positions, institutions become more responsive and international commitments produce measurable results.

A shared future cannot be built through declarations alone. It requires the powerful to accept common standards, developing countries to work together, and international institutions to serve the interests of all. Only then can global governance move towards a world in which peace, development and prosperity are not privileges reserved for the powerful, but opportunities shared by all.

[The writer is the Diplomatic Correspondent of The New Nation.]