India’s rise, Pak’s dilemma

The United States is the lone superpower in the present world. However, it has been shocked tremendously by the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers in the New York and other two places in the country.

This overwhelming shock drastically changed the US world view which let the old allies come together and also new enemies were created.

By analyzing the changes in the US policy toward South Asia from the Bush Jr. to Obama administration, it seems South Asia has occupied an important position in the US security strategy, although it was far from being the highest priority in the US foreign policy before the 9/11.

The event has deepened the relation.
In fact, US Policy toward South Asia has been fluctuating for several issues over the time.

Before 1971, the United States has changed its positions during the Sino-Indian war in 1962 and the Indo-Pak war in 1965 but continued the same policy on the question of deterrence and nuclear nonproliferation.

For an example, the United States sent its aircraft carrier The USS Enterprise, to the Bay of Bengal in 1962 in response to an Indian appeal to eliminate the threat from China. Again, in 1971 it sent the same carrier to eliminate Indian threat against Pakistan.

The US response to the incidents gives a clear indication of the unpredictability and unreliability of its policy.

In fact, it has developed a policy of continuations in parallel to fluctuations which is similar to its national ‘unity within diversification’.

However, by scrutinising seven decades of US-South Asia relations, the following characteristics are assumed in the patterns of US diplomacy:
Firstly, if the Sino-American relation becomes critical, India holds ‘preferential treatment’; secondly, if the Sino-American relation becomes warm, India gets ‘general treatment, thirdly, the United States has always allied with Pakistan but shows special respect to India as a regional power; fourthly, in the context of an Indo-Pak conflict, the United States generally takes a role of a mediator while Pakistan expects partnership behavior; fifthly, in Bangladesh, the United States prefers an anti-Indian government.

Pakistan was enjoying a higher US economic aid since 1955 by signing SEATO agreement, it was to face a sudden suspension of military aid in 1965 in the context of the Indo-Pak war, which continued almost up to 1980.

The United States resumed the military aid to Pakistan again after the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and this aid rose to a higher level up to 1990.

Again, as soon as the Soviet army was withdrawn, the US President denied certifying Pakistan about its nuclear weapons program, therefore, the Pressler Amendment cut of most aids through 1990s. This pattern has rendered US unreliable partnership with Pakistan over the years.

Moreover, Pakistan wanted US aid not only for the security purposes, but to meet up its development necessities. However, the major portion of US aid was to spend for security purposes.

US economic assistance to India
According to USAID, India received approximately $65.1bn in economic assistance from 1946 until 2012 surpassing even Israel from the United States and became the highest receiver.

Along with the economic aid, the US FDI in India is also remarkable. The following FDI chart shows that, from the beginning of the new millennium up to 2014, the US FDI in India is rising and there are less fluctuations in the flow.

As a point of comparison, according to the most recent data from USAID’s US Overseas Loans and Grants database (FY2011), Pakistan is the fourth largest recipient of US assistance, which is seven times more than in Bangladesh, with a comparable population size and similar development needs.

On November 9, 2001, President Bush told the visiting Indian Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee that his administration was committed toward developing a fundamentally different relationship with India, based upon both trust and mutual values.

Thereafter, just one year later of Bush’s announcement (in May 2002), US Special Forces were flown into India and took part in a two-week military maneuver in north India, in the historical city of Agra. It was the first joint military exercise between the two countries in 39 years, which revealed that Indo-US military cooperation had reached a high level.

After 9/11 attacks the United States felt that India, as a de-facto nuclear state, had co-operative potential with the US on the proliferation issue. The United States thinks that South Asia is the ‘most dangerous region in the world’ due to territorial disputes, the ethnic and religious divergence, and the nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan.

According to the US Under Secretary of State for political affairs Michael Armacost, “…due to size and population, military and scientific establishments, and its geographic position between the oil rich Persian Gulf and dynamics of economics of East Asia give the area’s geo-political importance.”

Only an Indo-US grouping can lead the United States securing a power advantage. Moreover, the Indian-Americans believe that China is a ‘threat’ to the interests of both India and the United States.

Not only that the United States feared about the possibility of forming China-India-Russia alliance based on a common understanding and interests of a new international political and economic order unless it would make a strategic partnership with India.

The new perception of India as an emerging power also led the US policy makers to reappraise their policy towards South Asia. Francine R. Frankel wrote, “…India is increasingly exercising its influence from the sub-continent to the Suez Canal and deserves the treatment given today in China, another emerging giant determined and able to play an independent role in Asia.

All these reasons have led the United States and India to come closer, especially after 9/11 attacks. It is a clear shift in US policy toward India from the policy implemented during the cold war era.

India’s policy of non-alignment, maintaining warm relations with the Soviet Union and contrasting United States’ policy of deterring the Soviet Union made it difficult for the US and India to work together.