Two Years After the Fall: Bangladesh’s Political Landscape in Flux
Two years on from 5 August 2024, Bangladesh stands at a crossroads. The old order that dominated for 15 years has been dismantled in formal terms.
Competitive politics has returned. Yet the deeper promise of systemic reform remains unfulfilled, and tensions over accountability continue to shape the national debate.
A general election held in early 2026 brought a new government to office. The return of multi-party competition is the most visible change from the pre-August 2024 era.
Political space has opened for voices that were previously marginalised.
The student-led movement that forced the change has evolved into organised political participation, most notably through the National Citizen Party, or NCP.
At the same time, a key vote on constitutional and institutional reforms, widely expected by mid-2026, has not been established.
The absence of this vote has left many who participated in the July–August uprising questioning whether the momentum for structural change is being sustained.
Without it, the risk remains that the transition settles into a conventional political settlement rather than delivering the deeper reforms many had hoped for.
The NCP has been particularly vocal on the question of accountability. Party leaders have stated clearly that if Sheikh Hasina returns from exile in December as she recently announced, she should be arrested at the airport and immediately placed on trial for the deaths of protesters during the crackdown.
There is to be no political negotiation or special treatment, they insist. The message is unambiguous: the era of impunity is over.
On 17 November 2025, the International Crimes Tribunal sentenced Sheikh Hasina to death in absentia for crimes against humanity in connection with the July massacre.
She was also given a life term and had her assets confiscated.
Separate corruption cases have added further sentences of 10 and 21 years. These verdicts have already settled the question of her legal culpability in the eyes of the court.
BNP leaders have echoed a similar hard line. Several senior figures have publicly declared that Hasina has already been prosecuted in the court of public opinion and through the tribunal process.
They argue that upon arrival she should be taken straight from the airport to jail to begin serving her sentence, with no fresh trial required.
The stance reflects widespread sentiment that the legal process has already run its course through the events of 2024 and the cases filed since.
Hasina’s reported plan to return voluntarily and surrender before the courts in December has been met with scepticism by most analysts. She faces multiple serious legal cases in Bangladesh, and her political base has been severely weakened.
Whether the announcement is a serious intention or a political signal remains to be seen.
Two years after the fall, Bangladesh has regained competitive politics but has yet to lock in the institutional safeguards that would prevent the return of authoritarian practices. Both the NCP and BNP have drawn a firm line on accountability.
How the country navigates the coming months — particularly around the stalled reform vote and any potential return — will determine whether 5 August 2024 becomes the foundation of a more accountable order or merely another chapter in a cycle of upheaval and incomplete change.
