China’s New Ethnic Unity Law Must Be Read Through History

For China, national unity is not merely a constitutional principle; it is a lesson drawn from more than two millennia of history.

That historical experience lies at the heart of the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Promoting National Unity and Progress,” which came into force on 1 July.

Since the Qin Dynasty first unified China in 221 BC, successive dynasties have sought to preserve the unity of a vast civilisation composed of diverse peoples, languages and customs.

In the Chinese historical experience, periods of unity have generally brought stability and prosperity, while fragmentation has often invited conflict, foreign intervention and national decline. It is this historical memory that continues to shape China’s approach to ethnic governance.

The establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 marked another decisive turning point. Mao Zedong described the revolution as a victory over the “three mountains” of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, reuniting a country fractured by warlordism, civil war and foreign occupation.

Declaring that “the Chinese people have stood up”, Mao linked national independence with national unity. On 27 February 1957, he reaffirmed this vision, stating: “The unification of our country, the unity of our people and the unity of our various nationalities – these are the basic guarantees of the sure triumph of our cause.” For the Communist leadership, national unity became the indispensable foundation of sovereignty, stability and development.

It was Premier Zhou Enlai who provided the most comprehensive explanation of China’s nationality policy. Speaking at the Nationalities Affairs Conference in 1957, Zhou argued that China could not simply replicate the Soviet model because the historical evolution of the two countries had been fundamentally different.

Unlike Russia, where many ethnic groups had lived in relatively distinct territories, China’s ethnic communities had intermingled over centuries through migration, trade and cultural exchange. As a result, China adopted a unitary multinational state with regional ethnic autonomy rather than a federation of autonomous republics.

Zhou’s speech remains remarkably relevant because it rejected both ethnic nationalism and cultural chauvinism. He warned against “Han chauvinism” that could lead to discrimination, while equally cautioning against “local chauvinism” that could encourage separatism.

“We must oppose the two kinds of chauvinism,” he argued, because both weaken national unity. His solution was neither forced assimilation nor ethnic isolation, but a common national objective built upon equality, mutual respect and shared prosperity.

Perhaps the most overlooked aspect of Zhou’s speech is his insistence on protecting ethnic identity. He argued that minority languages, customs and traditions should be respected, local cadres trained and autonomous areas administered substantially by members of the local ethnic communities.

Far from advocating uniformity, Zhou maintained that preserving national identity was essential to maintaining national unity.

The new Ethnic Unity and Progress Law should therefore be examined against this historical backdrop. Critics often focus on provisions promoting a stronger sense of Chinese national identity, but the legislation also contains explicit guarantees regarding equality, autonomy and cultural protection. Article 5 states that “all nationalities… are equal” and prohibits “discrimination and oppression”.

Article 8 reaffirms that the state “upholds and improves the system of regional ethnic autonomy.” These provisions suggest continuity rather than abandonment of China’s long standing constitutional framework.

Much attention has centred on Article 15, which requires the state to “comprehensively promote and popularise the national common language and script.” Critics interpret this as evidence of linguistic assimilation.

Yet the same article also states that the state “respects and protects the learning and use of minority languages and scripts”, supports their preservation and promotes research into minority linguistic heritage. The provision seeks bilingual capability rather than linguistic replacement.

From Beijing’s perspective, a common language serves practical rather than ideological purposes. In a country with 56 recognised ethnic groups and numerous regional dialects, Putonghua functions as a lingua franca that facilitates education, employment, tourism, scientific research and economic mobility.

It enables a young Tibetan to study in Shanghai, a Mongolian entrepreneur to do business in Shenzhen, or a Uyghur graduate to pursue opportunities across the country without abandoning mother tongues.
China’s nationality policy has also evolved alongside its broader development strategy.

Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening up reinforced the belief that economic development was essential to strengthening ethnic unity. That principle remains visible in today’s policies, which emphasise infrastructure, education, poverty alleviation and improved living standards in minority regions as integral components of national integration.

President Xi Jinping has expanded this vision within the broader framework of the “Chinese Dream” and national rejuvenation. In The Governance of China, he writes: “No region or ethnic group will be left behind when the whole country is working hard towards the goal of realising all round socialist modernisation.”

Elsewhere, he describes the Communist Party’s central task as leading “the Chinese people of all ethnic groups” towards national rejuvenation.

His well-known “pomegranate seeds” metaphor captures this philosophy elegantly: each seed remains distinct, yet together they form a single fruit. The image symbolises unity through diversity rather than uniformity through assimilation, echoing Confucius’ enduring principle of “harmony without uniformity”

This philosophy is reflected throughout the new legislation. Article 29 encourages different ethnic communities to appreciate each other’s cultures and learn each other’s languages, while Article 32 supports integrating minority regions into China’s broader modernisation strategy.

Whether the new law ultimately succeeds in achieving its stated objectives will depend less on its wording than on how it is implemented.

That debate will rightly continue. Whether one agrees with Beijing’s approach or not, understanding the new law requires viewing it through China’s own historical experience. Any serious assessment should consider the legislation in its entirety rather than picking one or two fragmented terms of the ethnic law.

(The Writer is the Diplomatic Correspondent of The New Nation.)