



When great powers cannot talk to each other, the states that can speak to both sides become indispensable.
The signing of the U.S.–Iran Memorandum of Understanding in Switzerland on 19 June will be remembered primarily as a diplomatic effort to pull the Middle East back from the brink of a wider conflict. Yet it should also be remembered for another reason: the important role played by Pakistan, alongside Qatar and Türkiye, in helping to sustain channels of communication between Washington and Tehran when direct engagement had become increasingly difficult.
For months, Pakistani diplomats reportedly worked quietly with regional partners to facilitate dialogue, reduce mistrust, and create political space for negotiations. International leaders and multilateral institutions acknowledged Islamabad’s contribution to the diplomatic process. For Pakistan, this represents more than a momentary diplomatic achievement. It offers a glimpse into a changing international order in which middle powers are becoming increasingly important managers of geopolitical risk.
The significance of this episode extends far beyond the immediate U.S.–Iran relationship. It raises a larger question: what does Pakistan’s role reveal about how international politics is changing?
The answer lies in the growing fragmentation of the global order.
For much of the post-Cold War era, the international system rested on a relatively simple assumption: economic integration and geopolitical cooperation could advance together. Open markets, expanding trade networks, global supply chains, and multilateral institutions created the impression that major powers would remain sufficiently invested in cooperation to manage crises collectively.
That assumption is now breaking down.
Strategic competition increasingly shapes trade, technology, finance, energy, and security relations. Economic interdependence, once viewed primarily as a source of prosperity, is increasingly being used as an instrument of geopolitical leverage. Rivalries among major powers have deepened, while international institutions have struggled to adapt.
The consequences are visible across the world’s most consequential conflicts. From Syria and Gaza to Ukraine and Yemen, the United Nations Security Council has frequently found itself constrained by great-power divisions. The institutions created to manage international order increasingly reflect geopolitical rivalries rather than transcend them.
The recent U.S.–Iran crisis illustrates this reality. Traditional diplomatic channels proved insufficient. European powers retained influence but lacked the access and trust necessary to bridge deep political differences. Washington and Tehran remained separated by decades of mutual suspicion and limited direct engagement. As formal diplomacy stalled, the need for credible intermediaries became increasingly important.
Into this diplomatic vacuum stepped a group of regional middle powers capable of maintaining relationships across geopolitical divides.
Pakistan was uniquely positioned to play such a role.
Its strategic value did not derive from overwhelming military or economic power. Rather, it stemmed from something increasingly scarce in contemporary international politics: connectivity.
Pakistan maintains working relationships with the United States, China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and the Gulf states. It occupies a geographical crossroads linking South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. It is a major Muslim country with diplomatic credibility across multiple political and ideological constituencies. At a time when many states are gravitating toward competing geopolitical camps, Pakistan has generally sought to preserve communication channels with a diverse range of actors.
This combination of geography, relationships, and diplomatic access constitutes a significant strategic asset.
Political scientists often describe such actors as brokers. Brokers derive influence not from dominating international networks but from connecting otherwise disconnected actors. Their value lies in facilitating communication, reducing uncertainty, and creating opportunities for compromise.
Pakistan’s role in the U.S.–Iran dialogue illustrates this principle. Its contribution was not coercive. Islamabad could not compel either side to negotiate. Rather, its value rested on credibility, access, and trust. Effective mediation depends on the confidence of all parties that messages will be conveyed accurately, discreetly, and without manipulation. By helping to sustain communication during a period of heightened tension, Pakistan performed precisely this brokerage function.
Equally important was the practice of strategic patience.
Successful diplomacy is rarely dramatic. It depends on quiet conversations, confidence-building measures, and persistent engagement away from public attention. In an era dominated by social media diplomacy and instantaneous political reactions, the patient cultivation of trust has become a scarce but valuable diplomatic resource.
The broader significance of this episode extends well beyond Pakistan.
A clear pattern has emerged over the past decade. Qatar facilitated negotiations between the United States and the Taliban when direct engagement was politically difficult. Oman repeatedly served as a discreet channel between Washington and Tehran. Türkiye helped broker the Black Sea Grain Initiative amid the Russia-Ukraine war. Increasingly, regional middle powers are performing diplomatic functions that major powers and international institutions are unable—or sometimes unwilling—to undertake.
This reflects a profound transformation in the distribution of diplomatic influence.
The conventional assumption has been that influence flows primarily from military capabilities and economic strength. Those factors remain important. Yet in an increasingly fragmented international system, another source of power is becoming more valuable: the ability to maintain relationships across rival geopolitical blocs.
States that can speak simultaneously to competing actors possess a unique form of diplomatic leverage. Their influence derives not from coercion but from connection; not from dominance but from access.
This is why Pakistan’s role deserves attention.
Its experience highlights a broader reality of contemporary international politics: middle powers are no longer merely followers of great-power agendas. Under conditions of geopolitical fragmentation, they are increasingly becoming managers of diplomatic risk and facilitators of strategic dialogue.
For Pakistan, this creates both opportunities and responsibilities.
The immediate gain is reputational. For decades, Pakistan’s international image has often been shaped by narratives of insecurity, terrorism, political instability, and economic vulnerability. A constructive diplomatic role offers a different narrative—one that presents Pakistan as a contributor to regional stability and international problem-solving.
Such reputational gains are not merely symbolic. Diplomatic success generates political capital. States viewed as credible and constructive actors often enjoy greater influence in international forums, stronger partnerships, and enhanced economic opportunities. For Pakistan, the opportunity extends beyond image management. Effective diplomacy can strengthen Islamabad’s voice in regional affairs and reinforce its credentials as a responsible stakeholder in international security.
There may also be tangible economic benefits. A durable U.S.–Iran understanding could contribute to greater regional stability, ease pressure on energy markets, and potentially create new opportunities for economic cooperation with Iran, including long-discussed energy projects that have remained constrained by geopolitical tensions. For a country that has repeatedly faced external economic shocks, a more stable regional environment carries obvious advantages.
Yet caution is equally necessary.
The Memorandum of Understanding is not a peace settlement. It is a diplomatic opening whose ultimate success remains uncertain. The issues that have divided Washington and Tehran for decades—including the future of Iran’s nuclear programme, sanctions, regional security arrangements, and missile capabilities—remain unresolved.
Negotiations may still falter. Domestic political opposition, renewed military escalation, or simple diplomatic deadlock could undermine the process. Pakistan must therefore resist the temptation of premature triumphalism.
Mediation creates expectations as well as opportunities.
A state that seeks influence through diplomacy must be prepared to sustain engagement after the headlines fade. Diplomatic achievements are meaningful only when they are supported by institutional capacity, strategic consistency, and policy coherence. Pakistan’s challenge is not simply to celebrate a diplomatic success but to institutionalise the capabilities that made that success possible.
Nevertheless, the significance of this moment should not be underestimated.
The world is entering an era in which geopolitical competition is making direct communication between adversaries increasingly difficult. As major powers become more deeply divided, the management of international crises will increasingly depend on states capable of operating across political, ideological, and strategic divides.
Influence in the twenty-first century will not be measured solely by military power or economic size. It will also be measured by the ability to connect rivals, sustain dialogue, and reduce strategic mistrust.
Pakistan’s role in the U.S.–Iran understanding demonstrates the value of such connective diplomacy. Its geography, relationships, and diplomatic reach position it uniquely within an increasingly fragmented international landscape.
The great powers created the divisions. Middle powers helped bridge them.
If Islamabad can build on this moment with strategic consistency and diplomatic vision, June 2026 may be remembered not only as a breakthrough in U.S.–Iran relations, but also as the moment Pakistan began to redefine its place in the world—from a state often associated with crises to one increasingly capable of helping resolve them.
(The author is a Professor, Department of Economics, International University of Business Agriculture and Technology (IUBAT), Dhaka Email: golam.grasul@gmail.com)