Civil Military Relations In Countries Of Asia

Forqan Uddin Ahmed :
The social science literature on civil-military relations-a concept that encompasses the entire range of interactions between the military and civilian society at every level-falls into a sociological and a political science strand. The former is concerned primarily with the military as a social organisation and the social functions of military systems, as well as the ways in which these factors have changed over time. The political science strand, in contrast, more narrowly focuses on political-military relations, that is, the structures, processes, and outcomes of the interactions between the institutions and organisations of the political system, on the one hand, and the armed forces and their members, on the other. As is the case with other continents, the study of civil-military relations in Asia is both normative and positive, often within the same work. While normative contributions ask what “good” civil-military relations should look like, positive analyses seek to describe and explain the actual relationship between the soldier and the state in Asia, examine the effects of military coups and military rule on other political or socioeconomic activities, and predict the consequences of political-military relations for the persistence and performance of political regimes.
Perhaps as a consequence of the highly diverse cultures, colonial histories, political legacies, and modes of postcolonial governance, single-case studies and small-n-comparative analyses dominate the field and systematic intra-regional comparisons and cross-national studies are rare. Since its inception in the 1960s, research on Asian Civil-Military relations in Social Science has moved in various directions: as elsewhere, its initial preoccupation was with the role of military institutions in processes of decolonisation, modernisation, and nation-building. In the 1970s, scholarship moved toward analysing the origins of military coups d’état and policy consequences of military rule. A second line of research investigated party-military relations in Communist Party regimes, which operated under societal and institutional circumstances that were quite different from those in the non-socialist states. From the late 1980s onward, the so-called third wave of democratisation inspired a new generation of civil-military studies, which illuminate the military’s role in the breakdown of authoritarianism and how young democracies struggle with the double challenge of creating and preserving a military that is strong enough to fulfill its functions, but that is subordinate to the authority of democratically elected institutions. In the 2000s, the study of security sector reform has become the most recent addition to the literature.
Bangladesh achieved its independence after 9 months bloody war. The Liberation War was overseen by the government in exile. The army element which revolted from Pakistan Army in East Pakistan formed the nucleus for organising the War of Liberation where hundreds and thousands joined the rank and file. Organisations were made in line of what was in practice under a commander in chief with no HDO. Subsequently three forces were organized who fought regular battle beside guerrillas and irregular forces joined by members of all walks of life. Bangladesh Army that emerged through liberation war chose to adopt similar regular elite officer led formation as that of other armies of the subcontinent under ministry of defence. Unlike India no formal political control mechanism evolved except post of a Defence Minister which was with head of the government. It continues as such except for a brief period in last days of Awami League regime led by Bangabandhu. Bangladesh to a great extent may also be categorised as Praetorian country since the country had gone through almost two decade of military rule. It is still to develop a democratic collective control with HDO under civilian control. Since 1976 ministry of defence has been stripped of all controlling power. Most of the executive power is with Armed Forces Division of Prime Minister’s Office, a unique provision was setup during General Zia’s regime made more powerful during late Hussain Mohammad Ershad’s regime. Nothing has changed since then. This is high time that to establish horizontal and vertical civilian control a collective control mechanism, as enshrined in the Constitution, be developed for national defence and security policy formulation and implementation through which the professionalism should be enhanced and organisational freedom is kept intact.
Bangladesh military though could be termed as army of liberation as it has glorious past of organising and fighting a Liberation War but retained its elite organisation. The core officers and other members had professionalism and experience minimum of 25 years continued history. One of the pioneering battalion had glorious history of war and held the attack of a division. Such was the case of political leadership who led the political movement except Bangabandhu who was not present rather was in Pakistani Jail. Therefore, regular forces were not institutionally controlled by the politician that created a distance. This visible even after liberation when military kept i n isolation. No collective civilian control was established and that vacuum continues through today. We now have to look at establishing that vital control to guide the military in achieving national goal and defend the territorial integrity, Control should not be one man or bureaucratic it has to be collective by the peoples’ representative without curtailing the organisational and operational freedom. There has to be structural control mechanism with reorganizing Defence Ministry to make it more responsive and controlling and supervising.
In the Twentieth Century, the armed forces, being an universal and integral part of a nation’s political system, no longer remain completely aloof from politics in any nation. If politics is concerned, in David Easton’s celebrated words, with the authoritative allocation of values and power within a society, the military as a vital institution in the polity can hardly be wished out of participatory bounds, at least for legitimate influence as an institutional interest group with a stake in the political decision-making. The varying roles the military may play in politics range from minimal legitimate influence by means of recognised channels inherent in their position and responsibilities within the political system to the other extreme of total displacement of the civilian government in the forms of illegitimate overt military intervention in politics.
The most important thing is that the military must be controlled by the state, more so in a liberal democracy by the politician, but not by the rigidity bureaucracy. Military must maintain its organisational flexibility and freedom. Taking more to liberal approach that Huntington picking up the similar thought Hobbs seems to have generated more study and put in practice First and second wave of democracies. However, there are countries which follow Janowitz’s theory of civil-military relations in case of citizen soldier or compulsory service. Nevertheless summing up all these theories it is well established that civil-military relationship i s formed and bounded by a structure both accepted and agreed upon by civil and military institution. In simple term these theories established, in simple term that civil-military relation revolves around civilian control over military drawing a limit not overarching in the area of military professionalism.
Civil-military relation, as evolved from theoretical and empirical studies one would conclude in a democratic set up it is the collective civilian control over military both in horizontal and vertically depending on the democratic maturity and maturity of political culture.
 (Forqan Uddin Ahmed, Writer, Researcher & Columnist)