Prof. Dr. Zahurul Alam :
[Part 1]
Recent diplomatic activity has revived discussions of a tripartite cooperation among Pakistan, Bangladesh and China, a grouping that would mark a significant shift in South Asia’s power geometry. Following the political transition in Bangladesh in 2024, Dhaka has begun to deepen ties with Islamabad and Beijing, exploring enhanced economic, infrastructure, and possibly security links. A trilateral meeting held in Kunming in mid-2025, the first of its kind between the three nations, highlights Beijing’s active role in fostering such an alignment.
This emerging “triangle” aims to leverage economic corridors, port access, infrastructure investment, and strategic balancing against India’s historical dominance in the region. But does the alliance have real staying power, or will it prove a fragile, tactical alignment easily undone by history, domestic constraints, and strategic contradictions?
Let us try to reveal the strategic rationale for the Bloc under consideration.
China’s Strategic Vision and Infrastructure Push
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its regional ambitions turn South Asia into a critical sphere of influence. For Beijing, binding Bangladesh and Pakistan closer offers new maritime access routes in the Bay of Bengal, strengthens its leverage against India, and expands Chinese economic outreach through ports such as Chittagong, Mongla and Karachi. Recent agreements to deepen Bangla-Pak-China cooperation, spanning ports, industry zones, logistics, water management, and trade, reflect these ambitions.
In a nutshell, the triangular alignment offers overlapping incentives, geopolitical leverage, economic connectivity, and room for China’s strategic expansion.
China could use this bloc to deepen influence across South Asia, offering investment, loans, and diplomatic alternatives to countries uneasy with India’s dominance. However, long-term structural sustainability seems doubtful. The alliance’s core problems, historical distrust, divergent national interests, asymmetric dependencies, public sentiment, and economic vulnerabilities, create deep centrifugal pressures.
Bangladesh’s Search for Alternatives and Policy Reset
Bangladesh’s evolving foreign policy posture in recent years reflects a complex balancing act in response to both domestic political pressures and shifting regional dynamics. Traditionally reliant on India for trade, transit, and security collaboration, Bangladesh is now increasingly exploring strategic alternatives, most notably deepening ties with China, as part of a broader effort to diversify its geopolitical dependencies.
This “policy reset” is not happening in a vacuum. The political developments of 2024–25, including the regime change and increasing estrangement from traditional democratic allies, have nudged Bangladesh’s interim leadership to seek new international backers less concerned with internal governance or democratic legitimacy. China, with its doctrine of non-interference and a track record of engaging with regimes of all types, appears an attractive partner. Beijing’s expanding footprint in South Asia via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), infrastructure loans, digital partnerships, and security dialogues offers Bangladesh a ready-made platform for economic and diplomatic recalibration.
In practical terms, Bangladesh has already seen significant Chinese investment in key sectors: over USD 10 billion committed in infrastructure, energy, and telecom since 2016, making China one of its top sources of FDI. Joint projects like the Payra Power Plant, the Karnaphuli tunnel, and various SEZs signal that this relationship is more than symbolic. The current political elite’s increasing China-leaning rhetoric, echoing themes of “sovereignty,” “non-alignment,” and “strategic autonomy” underscores this pivot.
However, the idea of forming a formal Pak-Bangla-China bloc introduces new complexities. While China may welcome strategic triangulation against India, it tends to prefer bilateral leverage over multilateral commitments, particularly in politically volatile regions. For Bangladesh, formal bloc alignment with Pakistan (its historical adversary) remains socially and politically sensitive, risking backlash from nationalist and pro-liberation segments of society.
Post 2024 changes in Dhaka’s leadership have triggered recalibrations in foreign policy. With bilateral ties to India under strain and skepticism over New Delhi’s approach to water sharing, border issues, and political pressure, Bangladesh’s interim government appears motivated to diversify strategic partnerships, particularly with China and Pakistan. For Bangladesh, Chinese investment, alternative entry points to global trade, and a reduced dependence on India are significant incentives
Pakistan’s Longstanding Alignment with China plus Desire for Regional Isolation of India
For Islamabad, a revived alliance with Dhaka under Chinese facilitation restores some regional relevance. It builds on the historical “all-weather friendship” with China and offers Pakistan a potential trading and logistic corridor eastwards, a strategic counterweight to India. Such cooperation could also deepen Islamabad’s access to Chinese capital and military cooperation, especially important given Pakistan’s economic fragility.
Pakistan-Bangladesh Historical Legacy and Distrust
The 1971 Liberation War and its aftermath remains a profound psychological and political barrier. Bangladesh’s national narrative is predicated on the two and half decade-long struggle for independence from Pakistan; memories of alleged atrocities, unresolved justice claims, demand for accountability and an official apology continue to resonate deeply. Any genuine alliance would require confronting these painful historical legacies, a nearly insurmountable political cost. This history undermines the trust necessary for stable cooperation.
Divergent Strategic Cultures and Domestic Priorities
On the other hand, Bangladesh and Pakistan face very different internal realities: demographic pressure, economic structure, political instability, and domestic priorities. While Pakistan remains economically fragile and security-oriented, Bangladesh’s focus remains developmental: infrastructure, trade, industrialization, and social welfare. Aligning these varying priorities under a common strategic umbrella will be difficult. Coupled with contrasting political cultures, this divergence complicates any long-term bloc coherence.
Economic Dependence vs. Sovereignty Risks for Bangladesh and Pakistan
Heavy reliance on Chinese investment, loans, and infrastructure projects risks creating a new kind of dependency, often described as “debt-trap diplomacy.” Pakistan’s large debt burden under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is widely criticized for undermining national sovereignty and creating long-term financial vulnerability.
For Bangladesh, similar patterns could emerge: port modernization, industrial zones, and infrastructure investments bring economic benefits, but heavy Chinese leverage over key projects could compromise sovereignty and domestic autonomy, especially if economic returns are slower than expected or demands on political alignment increase.
What It Means for South Asia: Risks and Regional Consequences
If such an alignment deepens, the regional order could shift, but not necessarily for the better. Possible broader outcomes:
· Fragmentation of regional cooperation: South Asian regional institutions (e.g. SAARC) may suffer further marginalization as sub-blocs emerge.
· Heightened strategic rivalry: India may respond with strengthened ties with other neighbors or global powers (e.g. U.S., Japan), intensifying the security competition.
· China could use this bloc to deepen influence across South Asia, offering investment, loans, and diplomatic alternatives to countries uneasy with India’s dominance.
However, long-term structural sustainability seems doubtful. The alliance’s core problems: historical distrust, divergent national interests, asymmetric dependencies, public sentiment, and economic vulnerabilities create deep centrifugal pressures.
Unless Bangladesh and Pakistan undertake serious reconciliation, address historical grievances, restructure economic dependencies, and build inclusive domestic consensus, the bloc risks collapse once immediate tactical goals are met or external pressures (such as debt burdens) surface.
(The author is Dean, School of Business Canadian University of Bangladesh)
