Prof. Dr. Zahurul Alam :
[Part 2 & last]
The genuine question is whether the Bloc is feasible or not? There are apparent short-term gains but unlikely long-term stability.
Given the dynamics discussed above, a Pak-Bangla-China block may succeed as a tactical, opportunistic alignment in the short to medium term, especially in trade, infrastructure investment, and limited diplomatic cooperation.
For example: Joint infrastructure projects (ports, industrial zones, logistics corridors) may proceed under Chinese funding.
· Ports like Chittagong, Mongla (Bangladesh) and Karachi, Gwadar (Pakistan) could become hubs in a new maritime-economic corridor. Indeed, very recently Bangladesh has gained access to Karachi Port under a revived trade arrangement after decades.
However, India’s Geographic, Economic and Cultural Weight needs to be taken into serious consideration in explaining the feasibility of the bloc in consideration.
India certainly will not tolerate any situation that may harm or reduce its interest and influence in the region.
On the other hand, regardless of diplomatic alignment, India remains Bangladesh’s dominant neighbor: geographically contiguous and economically intertwined. Most Bangladeshi trade, energy routes, remittances, people-to-people connections, and historical social links are deeply integrated with India.
This interdependence makes complete alienation or blockade impractical for Dhaka.
Attempts to boycott or isolate India would require massive restructuring of trade routes, energy supplies, foreign remittance flows, and economic partnerships, a tall order that could produce high economic and social cost.
Regional and International Risks: Destabilization, Isolation, and New Dependencies A formal alliance aimed at “boycotting” India or constraining its influence risks destabilizing regional dynamics.
It could provoke countermeasures from Delhi, push regional blocs into newer divides, and undermine subcontinental cooperation.
Bangladesh and Pakistan might find themselves isolated or trapped between a rising China and unsettled domestic responses.
Additionally, increasing Chinese military and strategic footprint in the Bay of Bengal or along shared borders could escalate tensions, provoke backlash, or draw unwanted regional attention.
History, geography, societal memory, economic asymmetry, and domestic politics together make this triangle fragile.
The deep wounds of 1971 between Bangladesh and Pakistan, combined with divergent economic priorities and the risk of crushing dependence on Chinese capital, present significant barriers to a stable, sustainable alliance.
Thus, for such a bloc to evolve into a long-term strategic force, rather than a temporary tactical instrument, would require genuine reconciliation, transparent governance, regional inclusivity, and carefully calibrated balancing.
Without these, the Pak-Bangla-China alliance remains more a geopolitical experiment than a durable paradigm shift.
For now, nations in South Asia (including India’s democratic neighbors) and global observers should approach this potential realignment with cautious interest, aware that what might seem a new order may collapse under its own internal contradictions sooner than one expects.
· Economic realignment: Trade, investment and supply chains could shift eastwards toward Chinese corridors, undermining previously integrated regional networks.
· Sovereignty and dependency concerns: Smaller partners (Bangladesh, Pakistan) risk getting locked into asymmetric dependencies with China, with diminished bargaining power.
· Domestic backlash: In Bangladesh, public opposition to Pakistan ties and overdependence on Chinese investments could fuel internal instability or nationalist resurgence.
In short, while the bloc may offer some short-term strategic and economic gains, it could undermine regional stability, interdependence, and long-term democratic and sovereign interests.
Strategic Caution Over Short-Term Gains
The idea of a Pakistan-Bangladesh-China alliance, poised to counter Indian influence, is indeed gaining traction buoyed by Chinese economic outreach, shifting political winds in Dhaka, and Islamabad’s perennial strategic vulnerability.
In the short term, cooperation in trade, ports, infrastructure and diplomacy may yield tangible benefits for all three, especially under China’s economic umbrella.
While a Pak-Bangla-China bloc might offer symbolic leverage or short-term diplomatic signaling against India, it remains structurally weak and geopolitically fragile.
Bangladesh, despite its growing ties with China, is deeply embedded in India’s economic and geopolitical orbit.
As of 2023, India remained one of Bangladesh’s top trade partners with bilateral trade exceeding USD 16 billion, and is a key supplier of essential commodities such as electricity, food, and medicine.
Nearly 80% of Bangladesh’s land trade still flows through Indian routes, and transit access to Indian ports has been a lifeline for both exports and imports.
Politically, Bangladesh has historically relied on India for security cooperation and regional influence, particularly during its liberation in 1971 and ongoing counterterrorism collaboration.
While China has made significant inroads via infrastructure investments under the Belt and Road Initiative, it has not replaced India’s proximity-based advantages.
Moreover, China’s cautious diplomacy, especially in South Asia, makes it unlikely to openly provoke India by cementing a strategic triangle that includes Pakistan, India’s arch-rival.
A hard alliance with Pakistan would also be politically contentious within Bangladesh.
The public memory of the 1971 genocide and unresolved historical grievances still shape public sentiment, and any overt tilt towards Islamabad risks domestic backlash. Furthermore, Bangladesh’s internal politics are in flux.
A future elected government may reassess foreign alignments, especially if the current extra-constitutional power structure lacks democratic legitimacy.
For Pakistan, which continues to face domestic instability, economic crisis, and strained credibility in the global arena, aligning with Bangladesh under a China umbrella might seem advantageous.
However, this risks provoking India into hardening its regional posture, militarily, diplomatically, or economically, which could trigger escalatory tensions.
Unlike in previous decades, China has shown reluctance to back Pakistan in direct confrontations with India, preferring calibrated rivalry over open conflict.
In sum, while the bloc may produce rhetorical unity and occasional tactical coordination, it lacks the strategic coherence, mutual trust, and historical foundation necessary for a durable alliance.
The asymmetric interdependencies, particularly Bangladesh’s reliance on Indian connectivity and markets, make long-term feasibility unlikely without significant shifts in regional power dynamics.
(The author is Dean, School of Business Canadian University
of Bangladesh)
