Dr. Nasim Ahmed :
Public policy-making is a dynamic process shaped by the interactions of various actors: politicians, bureaucrats, interest groups, civil society, international stakeholders, and citizens. These interactions are rarely neutral; incentives, strategic considerations, and expected responses influence them. Game theory analyzes strategic interactions where individuals or groups make decisions while considering the possible choices of others. It explains cooperation, conflict, and competition by predicting outcomes.
Game theory offers a valuable analytical perspective for understanding the complexities of public policy-making in Bangladesh. By modeling the incentives and actions of different players, game theory can explain why policies are created, why some fail, and how cooperation or conflict shapes governance results. It suggests that the strategic decisions of actors often determine whether public policy benefits the collective good or reinforces narrow interests.
Elections in Bangladesh exemplify game theory. Political parties behave as rational players seeking to maximize votes and maintain power. A “zero-sum game” typically governs electoral politics: one party’s gain is seen as another’s complete loss. This leads to frequent clashes among the country’s main political parties. Rather than adopting cooperative approaches, they often opt for confrontational tactics, believing that compromise might weaken their long-term political standing.
This zero-sum view often leads to poor results for the country. A game-theoretic approach shows that both sides could gain more in a “cooperative equilibrium” where they agree to play fair by specific rules. Still, mistrust and focus on short-term wins stop this from happening.
Bureaucrats and politicians also engage in strategic interactions. Policy development and execution often resemble a “coordination game,” where successful results depend on cooperation among ministries and agencies. For example, tackling climate change or improving education requires coordination between the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Finance, and local government entities.
In theory, coordination games can result in multiple equilibria: either efficient (when actors coordinate successfully) or inefficient (when they fail to align). In practice, bureaucratic silos, turf wars, and political patronage often cause inefficient outcomes. Ministries sometimes duplicate functions or resist cooperation to protect their jurisdictional power.
Game theory explains why even well-crafted policies fail during implementation: individual bureaucrats act logically to defend their interests, but together, these actions hinder policy success.
Public policy outcomes also reflect bargaining among diverse stakeholders. For example, labor laws in the ready-made garment sector, taxation policies, or energy subsidies result from strategic interactions between government, business groups, and international actors such as the International Labour Organization or the European Union (EU).
These bargaining processes can be viewed as “Nash bargaining games,” where actors seek to maximize their payoffs while considering the fallback options of others. When the EU threatened to suspend trade privileges after the Rana Plaza tragedy in 2013, policymakers faced a bargaining situation: resist international pressure or accept reforms. The government’s eventual reforms in labor law can be seen as the equilibrium result of these strategic negotiations.
Bangladesh’s foreign policy and international negotiations also reveal strategic maneuvers. As a country vulnerable to climate change, Bangladesh often participates in negotiations over climate finance and adaptation support. These interactions can be understood as “public goods games,” where developed nations are hesitant to contribute sufficiently because the benefits of climate mitigation are global, while the costs are borne by individual nations.
In this context, Bangladesh and other climate-vulnerable countries form coalitions to boost their bargaining power in international forums like COP summits. By collaborating with other Least Developed Countries and climate-affected nations, Bangladesh aims to alter the payoff structure, making it more expensive for developed nations to overlook their demands. This coalition approach reflects a game-theoretic view of international bargaining.
Public policy also relies on how citizens behave. Game theory helps explain collective action issues in Bangladesh, such as tax compliance, voting participation, or involvement in social movements. Tax compliance can be viewed as a “free-rider problem”: citizens might avoid paying taxes if they think others will contribute, resulting in underfunded public services. Voter turnout may be low if individuals believe their single vote won’t impact the outcome.
In Bangladesh, civil society movements and non-governmental organizations often try to shift this balance by building trust, mobilizing communities, and emphasizing the collective advantages of participation. Game theory indicates that these efforts work by changing perceived payoffs and lowering the risk of free-riding.
Game theory’s application in Bangladesh faces certain limitations: not all actors behave as purely rational players; emotions, ideology, and historical legacies often shape decisions. Information asymmetry is widespread: citizens often lack full knowledge of government policies, while policymakers may underestimate grassroots demands. Additionally, the dominance of patron-client relationships means that individual payoffs are tied not only to institutional incentives but also to loyalty networks, which complicates traditional game-theoretic assumptions.
Game theory offers a strong framework for analyzing public policy-making in Bangladesh. These insights indicate that improving public policy involves changing incentive structures, strengthening institutions, and building trust among stakeholders to promote cooperative rather than confrontational strategies.
Ultimately, applying game theory to Bangladeshi public policy shows that governance is more about interconnected choices than isolated decisions. Recognizing this interdependence is essential for creating policies that support collective well-being and sustainable growth.
(The author holds a PhD in Public Policy from Ulster University in the UK and currently works as Associate Professor of Public Policy at the Bangladesh Institute of Governance and Management, affiliated with the University of Dhaka. Email: [email protected])
