



The recent controversy surrounding the so-called ‘kitchen cabinet’ within the interim government led by Prof Dr. Muhammad Yunus has generated intense debate across political circles, social media platforms and sections of the mainstream press.
Several former advisers, including Brigadier General (Retd.) M SakhawatHossain, MdTouhidHossain, Prof AsifNazrul, Farida Akhter and Asif Mahmud ShojibBhuyain, have publicly distanced themselves from certain major policy decisions, particularly the much-discussed trade agreement with the United States.
Yet, amid the political noise, it is important to approach the issue with realism, institutional understanding and historical perspective.
In fact, the phrase “kitchen cabinet” is now being used pejoratively by loyalists of the Awami fascist regime in Bangladesh.
However, in political science and administrative practice, the concept is neither unusual nor inherently undemocratic.
Around the world, heads of government naturally rely on smaller circles of trusted advisers for swift consultation, crisis management and confidential deliberation.
Such informal consultative structures have existed in parliamentary democracies for decades.
In reality, the cabinet system under the Yunus administration was itself too procedurally rigid to respond effectively during periods of political uncertainty and national transition.
The interim administration was operating under extraordinary circumstances – facing economic pressure, diplomatic challenges, electoral uncertainty and heightened public expectations.
Under such conditions, the existence of an inner consultative group was not only predictable but arguably necessary.
Critics now claim that certain decisions were taken without the knowledge of the full advisory council. But collective responsibility remains a fundamental principle of governance.
Advisers who served within the administration cannot entirely detach themselves from policies adopted during their tenure merely because they were not part of every discussion.
Governments function through delegated authority, specialised responsibilities and internal coordination.
Every adviser does not participate in every negotiation, just as every minister in a conventional cabinet does not personally shape every state decision.
It is also somewhat contradictory that several former advisers acknowledge the existence of a kitchen cabinet as a common political reality while simultaneously treating its presence as evidence of wrongdoing.
Prof AsifNazrul himself rightly observed that almost every government in Bangladesh has had an informal inner circle. This is not a uniquely Bangladeshi phenomenon either.
From the United Kingdom to the United States, and even neighbouring India under leaders such as Indira Gandhi, governments have often maintained trusted policy groups outside formal institutional frameworks.
The more relevant question, therefore, is not whether such a mechanism existed, but whether it served the national interest.
On that point, the interim government deserves a fair and balanced assessment rather than politically charged speculation.
Prof Yunus inherited a deeply polarised political environment and a fragile administrative structure.
Despite these challenges, his administration managed to maintain relative stability, restore international confidence and continue critical state functions during a sensitive transitional period.
Decisions involving trade, diplomacy and national security required speed, confidentiality and coordination among a smaller number of experienced individuals.
Public administrations across the world frequently depend on such concentrated decision-making during periods of transition.
Moreover, some of the current criticism appears influenced by political positioning after leaving office.
It is easy for former officeholders to distance themselves from controversial decisions once they are no longer carrying the burden of governance.
However, leadership often requires difficult choices that cannot satisfy all factions simultaneously.
Retrospective disavowal may serve political convenience, but it does little to strengthen institutional accountability.
The discussion surrounding Dr. KhalilurRahman and his role in foreign policy decisions similarly deserves measured consideration.
Bangladesh’s increasing international engagement requires skilled diplomacy and continuity in strategic negotiations.
If certain negotiations were conducted by a specialised group of advisers with relevant expertise that should not automatically be interpreted as a conspiracy against democratic norms.
No administration is perfect, and constructive criticism remains essential in any democracy.
Nevertheless, reducing an entire transitional government to allegations surrounding a “kitchen cabinet” risks oversimplifying the realities of statecraft.
Governance is not conducted in abstract theory alone; it is shaped by urgency, complexity and practical necessity.
The interim administration led by Prof Muhammad Yunus should therefore be judged by its broader performance, institutional intentions and commitment to national stability rather than by sensationalised interpretations of internal consultation mechanisms.
In politics, informal advisory circles may invite debate, but they are often an inevitable component of effective governance – especially during extraordinary times.