Mandate And The Map: BNP’s Diplomatic Tightrope
H. M. Nazmul Alam :
When a party returns to power on the promise of “Bangladesh First,” the slogan inevitably raises a deeper question.
What does it mean to put Bangladesh first in a world where the country’s economy, security, labour market and even climate resilience are inseparably entangled with others?
The Bangladesh Nationalist Party’s foreign policy vision, unveiled with a confident emphasis on sovereignty, equality and mutual respect, signals both a return to familiar nationalist rhetoric and an ambition to reposition Dhaka in a rapidly shifting global order.
The real test will lie not in the poetry of independence but in the prose of diplomacy.
The manifesto’s assertion that Bangladesh has friends but no masters is politically resonant.
It speaks to a public fatigue with perceived asymmetries in bilateral relationships and anxieties about foreign interference.
Yet the contemporary diplomatic landscape is not structured around visible masters.
It is shaped by structural dependencies, supply chains, defence arrangements, market access regimes and financial institutions.
To govern under the banner of sovereignty while navigating these interdependencies requires not defiance, but dexterity.
The most immediate and delicate balancing act for a newly elected BNP government will involve the triangular dynamics among the United States, India and China.
Each represents a different form of leverage over Bangladesh’s future.
The United States remains the single largest export destination for Bangladeshi goods, particularly garments.
It is also a major source of development financing, a security partner in the Indo Pacific framework and an influential voice in multilateral institutions.
India is the geographically inescapable neighbour, intertwined through rivers, borders, trade corridors and security concerns.
China has become an indispensable infrastructure financier and a critical partner in industrial capacity and defence procurement.
A “Bangladesh First” policy cannot afford to tilt excessively toward any one of these powers. Nor can it afford rhetorical posturing that triggers suspicion.
If Dhaka leans too heavily into Washington’s Indo Pacific architecture, Beijing may reassess its appetite for concessional loans and infrastructure cooperation.
If it appears to drift closer to Beijing in strategic or defence terms, Washington’s scrutiny may intensify, with implications for trade privileges and financial engagement.
And if it attempts to recalibrate ties with New Delhi too abruptly, it risks unsettling arrangements on transit, connectivity and energy that underpin everyday economic functioning.
The BNP’s emphasis on non interference and mutual respect is a principled position. But in practice, this doctrine will be tested in areas where interests collide.
For instance, any attempt to renegotiate water sharing agreements on Transboundary Rivers, such as the Teesta, will require sensitive engagement with India’s domestic political landscape, particularly West Bengal’s role in river negotiations.
Similarly, efforts to curb border killings and push ins will demand more than declaratory statements.
They will require sustained institutional dialogue with Indian security agencies and a recognition of the complexity of cross border criminal networks.
On the American front, economic diplomacy will likely dominate the early agenda. The BNP has pledged to diversify exports and secure preferential trade arrangements.
Yet the debate surrounding a potential trade agreement with the United States has already revealed structural dilemmas.
Critics have argued that aspects of such an agreement could constrain policy space in areas like intellectual property, digital regulation and labour standards, potentially privileging foreign corporate interests over domestic industry.
The concern is not engagement per se, but the asymmetry of negotiating power.
If a future government pursues deeper trade integration with Washington without robust domestic consultation and institutional preparedness, it may find that “Bangladesh First” becomes difficult to operationalise in clauses written elsewhere.
The China question is equally nuanced. Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative has financed critical infrastructure in Bangladesh, from bridges to power plants.
These projects have enhanced connectivity and energy security. At the same time, global conversations about debt sustainability and strategic leverage have become more pointed.
A BNP government will need to reassure domestic audiences that infrastructure partnerships are economically rational and transparent, while signalling to Beijing that political transitions in Dhaka do not automatically translate into policy reversals.
The art will lie in extracting maximum developmental benefit without drifting into dependency.
The Rohingya crisis remains a moral and geopolitical burden.
The BNP’s claim of historical success in repatriation efforts during earlier crises carries symbolic weight. However, the current context differs dramatically.
Myanmar’s internal conflict has deepened, its military regime faces international sanctions and repatriation conditions are far from conducive to safe and dignified return.
Effective diplomacy will necessitate coordinated pressure through regional actors, perhaps including China, which holds leverage over Naypyidaw, and engagement with ASEAN mechanisms.
Any quick resolution is unlikely. Managing public expectations while sustaining humanitarian commitments will require sober realism.
Relations with the Muslim world, particularly the Gulf Cooperation Council states, present both opportunity and vulnerability.
Remittances from Gulf countries underpin macroeconomic stability.
Strategic partnerships that integrate Gulf capital with Bangladeshi labour and industrial capacity could be transformative.
Yet geopolitical rivalries within the Middle East often spill into broader alignments.
Dhaka will need to maintain neutrality while protecting the rights and welfare of its migrant workers, who frequently face precarious conditions.
Strengthening the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is a pragmatic acknowledgement that ambitions require capacity.
Professional training, expanded missions and improved consular services for expatriates are essential.
Yet institutional reform must go beyond staffing numbers. It must include policy coherence across ministries, data driven decision making and insulation of diplomatic appointments from partisan patronage.
Balancing America, India and China is not a zero sum game, but it is a delicate choreography.
Bangladesh’s geography makes it central to the Bay of Bengal’s evolving strategic theatre.
Climate vulnerability adds urgency to regional cooperation on disaster response and maritime security.
The Indo Pacific narrative promoted by Washington intersects with Beijing’s maritime ambitions and India’s neighbourhood policy.
Dhaka cannot ignore any of these frameworks. It must instead cultivate a reputation as a predictable, pragmatic and principled actor.
“Bangladesh First” will ultimately be measured not by the frequency of its invocation, but by the resilience of outcomes it secures.
Can export markets be expanded without eroding domestic policy autonomy? Can water sharing be improved without inflaming nationalist passions across borders? Can infrastructure partnerships be diversified without compromising fiscal sustainability? Can strategic partnerships be deepened without being drawn into rival blocs?
Foreign policy is rarely about choosing friends. It is about managing interests. If the newly elected BNP government can translate its manifesto into a disciplined practice of equilibrium, it may redefine Bangladesh’s place in a competitive region.
If it mistakes assertion for strategy, it may find that in a world of giants, standing alone is less empowering than it sounds.
(The Writer is an Academic, Journalist, and Political Analyst based in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Currently, he teaches at IUBAT. He can be reached at [email protected])