Bangladesh’s Next Government and the Burden of Post-Authoritarian Challenges
H. M. Nazmul Alam :
Bangladesh is approaching a political moment it has not genuinely experienced for over a decade: the possibility of an elected government emerging from a com6petitive vote and returning the country to a constitutional rhythm interrupted by years of authoritarian consolidation and abrupt collapse.
Yet the euphoria of electoral restoration, if it arrives, will be fleeting. The next government will inherit not a clean slate, but a fractured state, weakened institutions, a frightened citizenry and a political landscape littered with unresolved contradictions.
Its greatest test will not be winning power, but proving that power can once again mean order, legitimacy and restraint.
The most immediate and visible challenge will be restoring law and order in a society where the state’s monopoly on force has eroded alarmingly.
Over the past year, Bangladesh has witnessed the normalization of mob violence, vigilantism and gang justice. Shrines have been attacked, ideological opponents beaten, journalists intimidated and citizens punished in public spectacles while law enforcement stood by, confused or complicit.
This is not merely a policing failure; it is a crisis of authority. When mobs act with impunity, they do so because they sense that the state is either unwilling or unable to intervene.
The next government’s first real verdict will be delivered not in parliament, but on the streets, in police stations and courtrooms. Citizens will be watching closely to see whether the state can reassert itself without reverting to repression.
This task is complicated by the legacy of institutions hollowed out by years of politicization. The police, intelligence agencies and elite forces were previously deployed less as neutral enforcers of law and more as instruments of political survival.
Their credibility collapsed alongside the regime they served. Reforming these bodies will be unavoidable, yet politically dangerous. Move too slowly, and chaos persists. Move too aggressively, and accusations of vendetta politics will follow.
The challenge lies in rebuilding discipline; accountability and public trust simultaneously, an undertaking that requires patience, political courage and an unambiguous break from the habits of the past.
Beyond security, the new government will confront a deeper crisis of governance culture. Authoritarian rule did not merely silence opposition; it reshaped how power was exercised and perceived. Decision-making became centralized, dissent criminalized and loyalty rewarded over competence.
These habits do not vanish with a change of government. There is a real risk that new rulers, especially those long excluded from power, may be tempted to replicate the same tools under a different banner.
Public expectations, however, are higher than ever. Citizens are not merely voting for new faces; they are demanding a different political ethic. The failure to demonstrate visible departures from past practices will quickly erode whatever goodwill the election generates.
Perhaps the most politically sensitive challenge will revolve around the unresolved question of the Awami League. Its exclusion from the electoral process may be understandable given the trauma and violence surrounding its fall, but history offers little comfort to those who believe that a major political force with deep social roots can be erased indefinitely.
The dilemma is stark. Reintegrating the party too quickly risks reopening wounds and provoking backlash from victims of past abuses.
Keeping it permanently excluded risks driving its supporters toward radicalization or underground resistance, perpetuating instability. Navigating this paradox will require political maturity rarely seen in Bangladesh’s adversarial politics. Any durable solution will demand consensus-building across parties and institutions, something that has historically been treated as weakness rather than strength.
Foreign policy will further complicate this balancing act. Bangladesh’s relations with India, long entangled with domestic political alignments, will need careful recalibration.
A new government must assert autonomy without triggering unnecessary friction with its most influential neighbor.
At the same time, it will face growing pressure from global actors on issues ranging from democratic reforms to the Rohingya crisis.
The Rohingya issue itself has entered a new phase of fatigue and frustration. Hosting over a million refugees indefinitely is economically and socially unsustainable, yet repatriation remains elusive. The next government will have to project both humanitarian commitment and diplomatic resolve, without allowing the issue to be instrumentalized by external powers or domestic populism.
Economic challenges, though less dramatic, are no less dangerous. Bangladesh’s economy remains narrowly dependent on garments and remittances, leaving it vulnerable to global shocks and geopolitical shifts.
Political instability has already dampened investment and stalled business confidence. Reviving economic momentum will require more than slogans.
It will demand regulatory clarity, institutional predictability and a signal that cronyism will no longer dictate opportunity.
Without tangible economic relief, especially for urban youth and the middle class, political disillusionment could deepen rapidly.
The youth question looms over all these challenges like a quiet storm. The movements that destabilized the previous regime were powered by young people driven by anger, hope and impatience.
Those energies do not dissipate after an election. If anything, expectations intensify. A government that fails to translate political change into improved opportunities, fairer systems and meaningful participation risks facing a generation that no longer believes incremental reform is enough.
Disappointed youth have historically been fertile ground for extremism, nihilism or perpetual protest. Stability will depend not on suppressing youthful dissent, but on absorbing it into institutions that feel responsive and just.
Compounding these issues is the referendum on constitutional reform, which offers both opportunity and peril. Structural reform could address long-standing imbalances of power and accountability. Yet constitutional moments are also magnets for elite manipulation.
If reform becomes a partisan project rather than a national one, it could deepen divisions instead of healing them. The credibility of this process will depend on transparency, inclusivity and restraint, qualities often promised but rarely practiced.
Bangladesh stands at a crossroads where regression and renewal are both plausible futures. The next government will not be judged by the scale of its promises, but by its willingness to confront uncomfortable truths about power, violence and compromise.
If it fails, the country may risks sliding into a cycle of managed chaos where elections change rulers but not realities.
If it succeeds, it may finally begin the long process of transforming politics from a zero-sum contest into a shared responsibility. The difference will lie not in rhetoric, but in the hard, unglamorous work of rebuilding trust in a state that has forgotten how to be trusted.
(The writer is an Academic, Journalist, and Political Analyst based in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Currently he teaches at IUBAT. He can be reached at [email protected])