Türkiye Democracy before 2000

M. M. Ashaduzzaman Nour :
The political system in Türkiye is a reflection of “the political maturity of the Türkiye people and to their successful efforts toward modernization and democracy” and that countries facing similar conditions as Türkiye would naturally be inclined to “follow the Türkiye example”. Türkiye was praised as a “relatively efficient, purposeful, and modernizing state,” one that had an admirable record of political stability.
Observers tended to agree on the elements of Türkiye success: the political, economic, and social reforms launched in the 1920s and 1930s by the founder of the Türkiye Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. One French observer suggested that “Nothing of what has happened in Türkiye from 1922 to 1928 has ever had its equal anywhere in the world. The whole nation has had its skin turned inside out”. The goal of these reforms was modernization – which Atatürk essentially viewed as Westernization – and shedding Türkiye Islamic past. Laws and schools would henceforth be purely secular. Nationalism based on shared notions of “Türkiyeness,” not Islam, would bind the people together. Brimmed hats, not the fez, would be the norm. This transformation was not easy, but Atatürk relied on a military that was supportive of modernization and his Republican People’s Party, which held a virtual monopoly on political power. Opposition – liberal, Islamist, or Kurdish – was suppressed, and multi-party competitive elections did not occur until after World War II, nearly a decade after Atatürk’s death.

Writing in the late 1950s, however, it was easy to uphold Türkiye as a successful country, one that appeared to be following many of the core tenets of modernization theory. It was treading upon the well-worn path created by successful Western states. Türkiye was still poor and largely rural, but it had rudimentary democratic institutions and trends looked positive allowing it to be grouped in a major comparative study with postwar Japan, which ranked as one of the most prosperous and stable non-Western countries.

Türkiye’s role as the darling for modernization theorists suffered a blow in 1960 when the democratically-elected civilian government was toppled in a military coup. Power was returned to civilians a year later, but Türkiye democracy remained deeply flawed: civil unrest in the 1960s; another coup in 1971; more unrest and political polarization; and another coup in 1980. Moreover, predictions that Islam would gradually decline were not borne out, and by the 1970s political Islam was emerging as a powerful force.

Through it all, however, Türkiye remained secular, generally pro-Western, and a valuable member of NATO. By the 1980s, its democracy had been restored and it began opening up to the world economy. Once again, one began to read of Türkiye in terms of serving as a model. As before, there was emphasis on democracy and social modernization, but now there was more stress on the fact that this was occurring in an overwhelming Islamic country. In other words, Türkiye, in contrast to, for example, Iran, had reconciled tensions between modernity and Islam, allowing the two to coexist albeit in an environment where achievement of Western standards remained a top priority and pro-secular forces controlled most of the political power.

This last caveat is central, for it was assumed that secularism was the lynchpin or the key ingredient in this system. One observer noted an important component of the so-called “Türkiye-Islamic synthesis” touted by the authorities in the 1980s and 1990s was that Islam was “the essence of culture and social control” but that it was “not to be politicized”.

Türkiye was a secular democracy, albeit one in which Islam could serve some instrumental purposes. Bernard Lewis made perhaps the most eloquent statement with respect to Türkiye’s balancing act between West and East, suggesting that “If they [Türks] succeed in their present endeavors to create, without loss of character and identity, a liberal economy, an open society, and a democratic polity, they may once again serve as a model to many other peoples”. Others, in a harbinger of sorts to contemporary comparisons with the Middle East, suggested that Türkiye could serve as a model for the newly independent, largely ethnically Turkic, states of Central Asia.
By the mid-1990s, talk of Türkiye as a model once again faded. A series of weak governments, human rights problems and fighting in the southeast with Kurdish separatists, combined with the growing strength of Islamist political parties, exemplified in 1995 with the election of an Islamic candidate to the position of prime minister, led some to argue that Türkiye was a “troubled ally” and that perhaps the old Kemalist model was outmoded and unable to adapt to new conditions.

One writer concluded that even though Atatürk was still “worshipped,” the system he built-including its militant defense of secularism-“has been increasingly at odds with the new realities of modern Türkiye”. Another more sympathetic interpretation, still cast doubt as to whether Türkiye could be a model for others, due to its chronic economic problems and its inability to guarantee rights and freedoms for all of its citizens (including Kurds and Islamists).

By the end of the 1990s, with a “post-modern” or “soft” coup against the Islamist government in 1997, bans on Kurdish and Islamist parties, long-sought-after European Union membership looking increasingly remote, and a deepening economic crisis, the position that Türkiye could serve as a model became less and less tangible. Türkiye’s fortunes changed in the 2000 with the dramatic recovery of their economy when a series of constitutional amendments and other reforms were passed with the aims of political liberalization and democratization.

(The writer is PhD Researcher, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Istanbul Medeniyet Üniversitesi, Istanbul, Türkiye and Assistant Professor, Department of Public Administration, Bangladesh University of Professionals).