Emran Emon :
The recent decision by the Indian government to suspend several cross-border railway projects intended to connect its northeastern states (Seven Sisters) with the mainland via Bangladesh has sent ripples of concern across South Asia. Three India-assisted railway projects have now been suspended—the Akhaura-Agartala Cross-Border Rail Link (including the Khulabura-Sahabajpur rail line), the Khulna-Mongla Port Rail Line, and the Dhaka-Tongi-Joydebpur rail expansion project.
Officially, New Delhi attributes this abrupt move to political unrest and concerns over the safety of Indian workers in Bangladesh. However, a closer examination reveals a more nuanced reality: India’s dissatisfaction with the recent diplomatic posture of Bangladesh’s interim government, led by Nobel laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus, is a significant—though publicly unstated—driver behind this decision.
In opting for disengagement at a time of political transition in Bangladesh, India risks undermining not only bilateral relations with a close neighbour but also the broader vision of regional connectivity and shared prosperity that both nations have championed for decades. The suspension of these projects threatens to erode the long-standing trust between Dhaka and New Delhi and could have far-reaching consequences for South Asia’s political and economic landscape.
Cross-border railway projects between India and Bangladesh are not mere infrastructure endeavors. They symbolize a deeper aspiration to transcend colonial-era partitions, economic barriers, and historic misunderstandings. In recent years, both countries had taken significant steps to reinvigorate connectivity: reopening pre-1947 rail links, launching new bus routes, signing trade and transit agreements, and collaborating on energy projects.
These railways were set to be transformative for India’s northeastern states—regions often portrayed as landlocked and economically marginalized. The ability to seamlessly transit goods and people through Bangladesh would have reduced logistical costs, unlocked trade opportunities, and boosted regional development. For Bangladesh, these projects offered new revenue streams, improved access to Indian and Southeast Asian markets, and enhanced its strategic relevance as a gateway to the East. Thus, the suspension is not just a pause in construction—it is a pause in vision, ambition, and trust.
It is understandable that India, like any sovereign nation, is attentive to political changes in its neighbourhood. Bangladesh’s interim government under Dr. Yunus represents a departure from the familiar leadership India has dealt with in recent years. Concerns about diplomatic alignment, security cooperation, and economic policies under the new administration are valid topics for dialogue.
Since the downfall of the fascist Awami regime on August 5, 2024, India has been engaging in various conspiracies regarding Bangladesh. It has initiated a deterioration of diplomatic relations with the interim government, and the recent suspension of the cross-border railway agreement is part of that broader strategy. Under the ousted Awami regime, India manipulated Bangladesh to serve its own interests at will. However, with the current interim government’s new diplomatic stance, India no longer enjoys the same leverage, which explains its unreasonable and reactionary position.
Diplomacy, especially between close neighbours, must be resilient.
If India appears capricious or overly reactive, it risks opening the door to greater influence from countries eager to expand their footprint in South Asia—including China, which has already made significant inroads through infrastructure investments and trade agreements. Bangladesh that feels alienated or undervalued by India might diversify its diplomatic options, undermining India’s long-standing advantages in Bangladesh.
Moreover, the northeastern states of India, which stand to benefit immensely from better access through Bangladesh, will continue to suffer from economic isolation. Development in these regions is not just an economic imperative for India—it is also critical for addressing insurgency, ethnic tensions, and border security challenges. Suspending projects that could have stitched the northeast closer to the Indian heartland through Bangladesh is a strategic own-goal.
Diplomatic Engagement: High-level diplomatic channels should have been utilized more intensively to address political concerns with Bangladesh’s interim government. Constructive dialogue, not disengagement, is the hallmark of a mature relationship.
Phased Implementation: Projects could have been slowed but not entirely suspended, with timelines adjusted to account for political developments while keeping long-term goals intact.
People-to-People Linkages: Rather than pulling back, India could have increased cultural, academic, and business exchanges to maintain goodwill among the Bangladeshi public, strengthening civil society ties irrespective of government changes.
The India-Bangladesh relationship has weathered many upheavals—from water-sharing disputes to border management challenges. Yet, in recent years, both countries had managed to cultivate a partnership often cited as a model for South Asia. Trade volumes increased dramatically; cooperation against terrorism and insurgency intensified; people-to-people contacts blossomed.
It is still not too late for India to recalibrate. Reengagement, clear communication, and the resumption of halted projects would send a powerful signal that New Delhi values Bangladesh not just as a partner of convenience, but as a permanent stakeholder in a shared regional future.
India’s suspension of cross-border railway projects with Bangladesh represents a significant setback at a time when both nations—and the wider region—desperately need more cooperation, not less. Infrastructure is more than concrete and steel—it is a manifestation of political will, mutual respect, and common destiny. In halting these projects, India has unfortunately chosen caution over vision, and suspicion over trust. The need of the hour is to rebuild confidence, reaffirm commitments, and resist the temptation to let short-term political anxieties derail long-term strategic interests.
South Asia stands at a crossroads. It can choose a future marked by walls of mistrust or bridges of understanding. India and Bangladesh, with their deep bonds and shared dreams, must choose the latter—for the sake of their people, and for the promise of a better, more connected future.
India’s worsening relationship with Bangladesh bodes ill for its own strategic future. It must realize that Bangladesh, by virtue of its geographical strategic position, occupies a pivotal position in South Asia—and is of even greater strategic importance to India itself. Any decline in bilateral ties with Dhaka will inevitably open doors for rival powers to extend their influence, ultimately undermining India’s position in the region. In this context, India’s recent decision to suspend cross-border railway projects with Bangladesh risks becoming a self-inflicted wound—a short-sighted move that may well boomerang and weaken India’s own strategic position.
(The writer is a journalist, columnist and analyst of South Asian affairs.
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