Kassir Kassem :
Since 7 October, 2023, we have been witnessing a new phase in the conflict with the Zionist enemy that this conflict has not witnessed since 1948. After the Al-Aqsa Flood battle launched by Hamas on 7 October from the Gaza Strip, we are now in a new phase in the confrontation between Hezbollah and the Zionist enemy, and the Lebanese support front has become an open war.
After Hezbollah and a large number of its leaders have been sacrificed martyrs, the blood struggle has expanded from Palestine to Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq and other countries.
We are witnessing the Islamic Resistance engaging in new forms of confrontations and challenges to bring down the Israeli-US project aimed at establishing a new Middle Eastern system and crushing the Resistance forces.
So, what is the image of the confrontations today in Lebanon after the martyrdom of Hezbollah Secretary-General, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, and a number of his military and security leaders? Where is the situation headed after the start of the Israeli ground attack in southern Lebanon? What is the situation one year after the launch of Al-Aqsa Flood?
A year after the Al-Aqsa Flood and the launch of the Lebanese support front for Palestine led by Hezbollah and, with the participation of a number of national and Islamic forces, this battle witnessed dangerous developments in the form of the Israeli enemy targeting Hezbollah with a series of military and security operations and unconventional air raids that led to the martyrdom of its Secretary-General and a number of military and security leaders.
This is in addition to targeting the alternative communications system it adopted, including pagers and wireless devices, and carrying out major raids on all Lebanese regions, leading to the displacement of about one million Lebanese citizens from the south, the southern suburbs and the Beqaa to other regions.
It also adopted a policy of systematically destroying villages, cities and residential areas in more than one Lebanese region, then leading to the launch of the ground operation in southern Lebanon, which may develop and extend to occupying large areas of Lebanon.
However, despite the magnitude of the severe blows that the party and its surroundings were dealt, it succeeded in absorbing the shocks, reorganising its internal situation and military and security structure, and preparing to fight off the ground aggression, while continuing to support the Gaza front and launch rockets at Israeli cities and settlements.
Hence, we are facing a new phase in the confrontation between the Resistance forces and the US-backed Israeli enemy and, just as Hamas succeeded in confronting the Israeli aggression in Gaza despite all the sacrifices and the martyrdom of a number of its leaders, most notably Ismail Haniyeh and Saleh Al-Arouri, Hezbollah will manage to tackle the challenges and the new war, despite the severity of the blows the party was dealt.
Leading sources in Hezbollah confirm that the party has absorbed all the shocks and reorganised its internal structure, and that the party leadership was careful not to elect a new Secretary-General at the present time and to adopt collective leadership according to the party’s internal regulations.
Deputy Secretary-General, Sheikh Naim Qassem, announced the party’s positions on all internal and external developments and stated that the election of the Secretary-General will take place at a later time.
Through the internal data in Hezbollah, the following points can be confirmed:
First: The party leadership considers the battle to be ongoing and open to all possibilities, and therefore the battle will be fought gradually in the use of military capabilities and abilities based on the field developments.
Second: The party keeps pace with political developments and communications and adopts a flexible approach in managing political affairs, refraining from setting one single option.
The strategic goal is to link the war in Gaza with the war on Lebanon, which it has not abandoned, and it stresses the connection between the battle in Palestine and the battle in Lebanon, as was confirmed by the Deputy Secretary-General in his first appearance after the martyrdom of Hassan Nasrallah and his companions.
Third: Despite the severity of the military and security battle, the party’s leadership also keeps up with all non-military files, especially the concerns of the displaced, internal repercussions and how to absorb the political and social repercussions, in addition to communicating with all governmental and private bodies and institutions.
Fourth: Contrary to what is being circulated about Iran abandoning its support for the party and stirring up conflicts between the party and the Iranian leadership, coordination with the Iranian leadership and the forces of the Axis of Resistance is ongoing.
An agreement has been reached on how to manage the battle and field cooperation and there are no disputes or differences in points of view. Hezbollah trusts the Iranian leadership and its role, which has been evident throughout the 42 years since the party was founded.
Fifth: The party has benefited greatly from the experience of the battle in Gaza on the field level, even though it faces new forms of electronic and security warfare and is trying to address the gaps that have emerged.
Sixth: The party is present in keeping pace with the war and it is reaching its wide scope. There are many calculations and considerations it takes into account in managing the battle, which have not been revealed.
Seventh: The party’s leadership is focused on the field, and it will have the final word on matters.
In light of these facts, we are facing a long war, open to all possibilities, especially as the Israeli-American goal has expanded greatly. It wants to eliminate the Resistance forces, besiege Iran, and establish a new Middle Eastern system but, just as the aggression failed in the July 2006 war, and just as the Palestinian Resistance succeeded in Gaza and the West Bank, Lebanon will be a new arena for resistance, steadfastness and victory.
(This article appeared in Arabic in Arabi21 on 2 October, 2024. Courtesy: Middle East Monitor).
