The existence of an extradition treaty between Bangladesh and India has revived a contentious question: does the policy actually allow Sheikh Hasina’s return, or does it merely offer the illusion of legal recourse? The honest answer lies somewhere in between.
The treaty permits extradition in theory, but in practice, it places formidable barriers in the way—especially in cases as politically sensitive as this one.
Legally, the India–Bangladesh Extradition Treaty does not exclude political leaders. It allows for the handover of individuals charged with serious offences, provided those offences are recognised in both countries and supported by evidence.
On paper, therefore, the policy does not shut the door on extradition. It leaves room—narrow but real—for a formal request.
Yet the same treaty also contains safeguards that significantly weaken that possibility.
Chief among them is the political-offence exception. India is entitled to refuse extradition if it believes the charges are politically motivated or arise from political conflict.
In the case of a former prime minister, this threshold is almost inevitably triggered. Even criminal allegations risk being viewed through a political lens, regardless of how carefully they are framed.
Equally decisive are provisions relating to fair trial and human rights. India retains the discretion to deny extradition if it doubts the impartiality of proceedings or fears that due process and personal safety may not be fully guaranteed.
These clauses are standard in international law, but they carry particular weight in high-profile political cases.
They allow refusal without breaching treaty obligations. Beyond law lies geopolitics. Extradition is not merely a judicial act; it is a political decision.
India’s long-standing strategic relationship with Hasina’s government, its preference for regional stability, and its reluctance to set precedents involving former head of governments all shape the outcome. No treaty operates in a vacuum, and this one is no exception.
This does not mean Bangladesh is without options. A transparent, strictly legal approach—grounded in specific charges, independent investigations, and credible guarantees—would strengthen any request.
But expectations must be realistic. The treaty allows extradition; it does not compel it. And in politically charged cases, discretion usually prevails over obligation.
Ultimately, Bangladesh’s democratic renewal cannot hinge on the return of one individual.
Accountability must be built at home through strong institutions, impartial justice, and respect for the rule of law. Extradition, if it comes, should be the result of that strength—not a substitute for it.
The policy may keep the door ajar, but whether it ever opens depends far less on legal text than on political reality.
