Special Report :
India’s long-standing strategy of consolidating regional influence through partisan alliances is unraveling, as Bangladesh – historically aligned with New Delhi – pivots toward deeper engagement with Pakistan.
This recalibration comes in the wake of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s ouster and the rise of an interim government led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus.
Yunus’s administration has, in short order, brought relative calm to a country rocked by years of economic mismanagement and authoritarian rule.
The economy is stabilizing, payments have resumed to foreign entities, including India’s Adani and Reliance power projects that had been unpaid for nine months, and diplomatic overtures have diversified beyond India’s shadow.
But the deeper structural flaws in Bangladesh’s governance remain unaddressed.
At the core of the country’s instability lies a bastardized constitution, which provides no real safeguards against authoritarianism cloaked in electoral legitimacy. The document, rewritten and reshaped over decades of political manipulation, effectively merges the judiciary and executive under the control of the legislature.
This gives unchecked power to whichever party secures office – whether through genuine mandate or fraudulent election.
Under this system, elected fascists can hijack state institutions – from the judiciary to law enforcement to the military – to perpetuate corruption, crush dissent, and orchestrate mass killings. This was starkly visible during Sheikh Hasina’s 17-year rule, during which nearly 2,000 students were brutally killed and over $200 billion looted from state coffers and laundered abroad.
The stakes are high. Bangladesh is powered by nearly $30 billion annually in remittances from its 20 million migrant workers, yet it remains a textbook example of a remittance-fueled kleptocracy. Once political elites gain control of the state apparatus, they gain a license to plunder these hard-earned funds with impunity.
So far, the interim government has failed to introduce meaningful constitutional reform. While it has brought transparency and fiscal discipline back to the short-term management of the economy, its inaction on structural reform raises concerns about whether the cycle of state capture and elite plunder will simply repeat under future administrations.
Meanwhile, Dhaka’s foreign policy posture has shifted markedly. For the first time in 15 years, Bangladesh has rekindled diplomatic relations with Pakistan – a move that challenges India’s regional calculus. From high-level meetings and restored trade to military dialogue and cultural exchange, ties are strengthening at a pace unseen in decades.
A 27 per cent rise in bilateral trade with Pakistan since Hasina’s fall, compared to a 9.5 per cent decline with India, reflects a realignment in progress. Direct flights have resumed, visa restrictions have been eased, and defense discussions – including interest in Pakistan-China developed JF-17 fighter jets – have raised alarms in New Delhi.
India’s BJP-led government, which supported Hasina to safeguard its northeastern borders and strategic interests, now finds itself watching these developments with increasing unease. Many Bangladeshis, particularly students and civil society actors, blame India for enabling and shielding Hasina’s repressive regime. As Imtiaz Ahmed of the Centre for Alternatives put it, “India built a political party-centric relationship – not a people-centric one.”
This diplomatic opening with Pakistan is not without precedent. In 1974, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman welcomed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in Dhaka, and later that year attended the OIC Summit in Lahore, signaling that post-war reconciliation was once politically feasible.
Today, analysts argue that holding modern Pakistan accountable for 1971’s atrocities – carried out by a now-defunct military junta – is an obstacle to forward-looking diplomacy. Just as the world doesn’t hold modern Germany responsible for Hitler’s crimes, Bangladesh must judge Islamabad on present policy, not historic guilt.
Additionally, both countries share a pressing grievance: India’s control over transboundary rivers. The Indus Water Treaty (IWT) remains a flashpoint in Indo-Pakistani relations, and for Bangladesh, the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty of 1996 – which guaranteed 35,000 cusecs in alternating 10-day intervals during the dry season – expired this year without renewal. The absence of an updated framework gives India unilateral leverage, harming Bangladesh’s agriculture and water security.
These shared vulnerabilities, alongside religious and geopolitical affinities, are drawing Bangladesh and Pakistan closer – creating a more multipolar South Asia in which India can no longer count on passive neighbors.
However, this emerging alliance remains fragile. The legacy of the 1971 war, unresolved demands for apology and reparations, and diverging domestic priorities could all slow progress. Moreover, without serious constitutional reform, Bangladesh risks returning to autocracy – whether under the interim regime or any elected successor.
For now, India faces a transformed neighborhood: a rival to the west, and a no-longer-compliant partner to the east. If New Delhi is to maintain its influence, it must rethink its approach – away from enabling autocrats, and toward supporting democratic institutions and people-centered partnerships.
If not, Bangladesh’s shifting loyalties may serve as the first of many reminders that unchecked power – whether at home or abroad – is no longer a sustainable strategy in an increasingly interconnected and unpredictable South Asia.
