Bangladesh’s NDA with the United States: Secrecy, Sovereignty, and Economic Risk

Prof. Dr. Zahurul Alam :

Recently, reports emerged that the Bangladeshi interim government led by Dr. Muhammad Yunus signed a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) with the United States as part of negotiations over a reciprocal tariff trade deal.

The pact, still secret and scheduled for formal signing this month (February, 2026), has drawn intense criticism from political analysts, economists, and business leaders.

Critics warn it could undermine Bangladesh’s sovereignty, limit transparency, and saddle the economy with long-term commitments that are not in the public interest.

Supporters of the deal emphasize potential benefits, such as improving access to the important U.S. market for Bangladeshi exports.

However, the secrecy surrounding the agreement and the NDA’s legal and economic implication have sparked debate across political, legal, and economic spheres in Bangladesh.

A Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) is a legal contract wherein one or more parties agree not to disclose specified information to outsiders.

NDAs are commonly used in business to protect trade secrets, confidential negotiations, or proprietary processes.

In international diplomacy, countries sometimes agree to confidentiality during sensitive negotiations to preserve negotiating positions or protect national security information.

In trade contexts, NDAs may be used to allow negotiations on tariff reductions, technical standards, or regulatory issues without immediate public disclosure.

However, in Bangladesh’s case, the use of a binding NDA in trade negotiations between two sovereign states, rather than a routine commercial confidentiality clause, is unprecedented and has raised questions.

The NDA reportedly binds Bangladesh to confidentiality about the terms and conditions of the negotiations and the resulting agreement.

This means that, unless Washington agrees to disclosure, the Bangladeshi government may be legally barred from publishing the text, even under domestic law or in response to Right to Information (RTI) requests.

Notably, this NDA is the first of its kind in Bangladesh’s trade history, more stringent than a “non-paper,” which is an informal, non-binding statement typically used in diplomacy.

The formal NDA is said to be legally enforceable and prohibits sharing negotiation details with stakeholders, including business associations and Parliament.

Under international law, sovereign states can negotiate and sign agreements confidentially if both parties consent.

There is no universal rule that forbids confidentiality in diplomacy or trade negotiations. Many international agreements are negotiated privately before being published.

However, once finalized, most modern trade agreements are made public to allow businesses, lawmakers, and civil society to understand their implications.

Confidentiality itself is not intrinsically illegal, but its application raises questions about democratic accountability in parliamentary democracies like Bangladesh.

Bangladesh’s constitution and statutes such as the Right to Information Act (RTI) aim to ensure transparency and public access to government information.

While trade negotiations can require confidentiality, outright withholding of agreement terms under an NDA, especially if the state binds itself not to disclose to its own citizens or representatives, clashes with principles of public accountability.

In many democracies, international agreements that affect trade, tariffs, and national policy are subject to parliamentary review or ratification, even if confidentiality is initially applied to negotiation stages.

When an NDA prevents any disclosure even to domestic institutions, it creates tension with domestic legal norms designed to ensure transparency and oversight.

NDA is controversial, because it carries several risks:
· Weakening of Sovereignty: By undermining the sovereign right of Bangladesh to determine and discuss trade policy openly.

By restricting information, the government prevents public and legislative scrutiny of commitments that could have lasting economic consequences.

· Lack of Accountability: The deal is being finalized by an interim government that lacks full democratic legitimacy. This timing, combined with the NDA’s secrecy, has intensified concerns that decisions with long-term consequences are being taken without proper oversight.

· Potential Economic Imbalance: Beyond tariffs, the agreement may include provisions affecting national regulatory authority, intellectual property standards, customs procedures, and other policy areas, potentially requiring Bangladesh to adopt U.S. norms or reduce protections for local industries.

· Restrictions on Stakeholder Engagement: The NDA reportedly restricts even authorized stakeholders, including trade bodies and legal advisers, from accessing key negotiation details.

This can undermine Bangladesh’s ability to form informed positions or challenge potential provisions that could hurt domestic interests.

The central aim of the negotiations has been to reduce high reciprocal tariffs imposed by the U.S. on Bangladeshi exports, particularly ready-made garments.

Bangladesh’s exports to the U.S. are significant, worth billions annually, and tariff changes can materially affect competitiveness.

However, while tariff reductions can benefit exporters, the terms required to secure them under the NDA might impose conditions on Bangladesh’s regulatory autonomy, especially in:
· Acceptance of U.S. standards for pharmaceuticals, automotive imports, and agricultural goods.

· Changes to customs and data-sharing practices for trade enforcement.
· Removal of certain tariffs or regulatory duties on U.S. imports.

These conditions, if included, could expose local industries to increased competition and reduce government policy space.

There are conflicting narratives about specific procurement commitments.

There are claims that the NDA and related agreements have already influenced procurement decisions, such as aircraft purchases and large import contracts for wheat or LNG, allegedly under terms favorable to U.S. suppliers and less competitive on price compared to global markets.

However, official statements from government advisers deny that specific procurement deals, such as the Boeing aircraft purchase.

They insist that the trade deal’s text will be published with U.S. approval and that terms do not harm national interests.

Despite that such NDA may lock Bangladesh into external standards that may not align with domestic needs or comparative advantages, especially in key sectors like agriculture, apparel, and pharmaceuticals.

Also limiting imports from non-U.S. partners, particularly China or other key supply chains, could disrupt established trade relationships and input markets.

While confidential negotiation frameworks are not unusual globally, Bangladesh’s case appears unique in the scale and binding legal nature of the NDA, reportedly restricting information even from domestic stakeholders, which is atypical in trade diplomacy.

Moreover, the fact that this NDA was signed prior to detailed parliamentary or stakeholder engagement, and without public debate, has raised questions about procedural propriety in a democratic republic.

Since the NDA in question binds Bangladesh not to disclose details without U.S. consent, the text of the trade agreement is unlikely to be made public until both governments agree.

Government officials have suggested that, after signing, a joint statement or redacted version could be released with U.S. approval.

The reported NDA between Bangladesh and the United States, designed to keep a bilateral trade deal confidential, is not inherently illegal in international law, but it raises serious questions about transparency, democratic accountability, and national sovereignty.

(The author is Dean School of
Business Canadian University of Bangladesh)