Barrister Ehsan A Siddiq
The political future of Bangladesh is now being shaped by the debate over how to implement the constitutional reforms promised in the July Charter. Three of the country’s major political parties—the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, and the National Citizens Party (NCP)—have each submitted their own proposals to the National Consensus Commission. These submissions reveal not only their approaches to reform but also their seriousness, or lack thereof, in turning the Charter from words on paper into lasting institutional change. In this article, I will examine the recommendations of all three parties and assess what these competing visions mean for the nation’s path towards democratic stability.
On 3 September 2025, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) laid out its official position on how the July Charter should be put into action. The party backed a clear three-step roadmap. First, it said the Interim Government should carry out the urgent reforms that do not require changes to the constitution. These could be done quickly through ordinances, rules, or administrative measures. Second, the BNP urged the Interim Government to also begin work on the less urgent reforms, so that progress is not delayed. Finally, and most importantly the BNP stressed that only the next elected government should be allowed to complete the July Charter’s constitutional amendments within its first two years.
When it comes to implementing the July Charter, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has built its entire proposal around the claim of “constitutional continuity”. The BNP insists that the July Revolution of 2024, and the formation of the current Interim Government, did not violate the Constitution. For them, the Charter should not be treated as something “supra-constitutional,” or higher than the Constitution. Instead, they argue that reforms must be carried out within the existing legal framework, with amendments to be passed by a new Parliament. In BNP’s eyes, any attempt to place the Charter above the Constitution would amount to a coup, not a revolution. At first glance, this appears to be a cautious approach to maintain stability in the country. It promises reform without tearing apart the existing legal order.
But there is a serious flaw in BNP’s reasoning. The removal of the Awami League government on 5 August 2024 cannot be explained or justified under the Constitution. There are no provisions that allow citizens to depose a government by mass uprising. Nor does the Constitution provide for an Interim Government of Advisors like the one now in power. In truth, the July Revolution and everything that followed took place outside the constitutional framework. The Interim Government’s legitimacy does not come from the existing Constitution at all. Its authority comes from the will of the people.
From this perspective, insisting on “constitutional continuity” looks less like stability and more like denial. The revolution was not about patching up the existing Constitution, it was about rejecting it. The Interim Government, far from being unconstitutional or unlawful, is instead the living embodiment of popular sovereignty. The BNP’s path is to keep reforms tied to the existing Constitution. However, the revolution already broke that order, and legitimacy now rests on the people’s will expressed on 5 August 2024.
Also, the July Charter includes a number or reform proposals, which are contrary to the basic structure of the existing constitution. Some of these proposals are the decentralisation of the Supreme Court and the bicameral legislature. The BNP, while expressing its agreement in principle with these constitutional reforms, has failed to articulate a coherent strategy for their implementation. In particular, it has not explained how such reforms, which would offend the basic structure doctrine as recognised by the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, could be validly enacted. This silence inevitably raises doubts as to the party’s commitment to implementing the July Charter in its entirety.
Finally, the BNP treats the Charter mainly as a “political promise”, rather than as the true will of the people. This is a troubling position because it weakens both the importance of the Charter and its legal foundation. According to the BNP, the only safeguard is that political parties should sign the Charter, include it in their election manifestos, and then be judged by voters. But this is a very weak form of protection. Political parties often break their promises, and if they do, there is no legal way to force them to honour their commitments.
On 5 September 2025, the National Citizen Party (NCP) submitted its proposal to the National Consensus Commission on how the July Charter should be put into action. Of the three parties, the NCP’s recommendations were the briefest. The party’s main idea is simple: the Charter should be adopted and implemented by a Constituent Assembly. According to the NCP, this is the most democratic and effective way forward. The party argues that because the Charter expresses the sovereign will of the people, it must be carried out by a body that is broadly representative and democratically accountable.
Although the National Citizen Party (NCP) did not say so clearly in its letter to the National Consensus Commission, its position is easy to understand. The NCP believes that large parts of the existing Constitution are no longer effective and should be replaced by the July Charter. While it stops short of declaring this openly, the logic of its proposal points in that direction. By insisting that the Charter must be endorsed by a Constituent Assembly, the NCP is in effect trying to give it the status of a special constitutional order or at the very least, a pre-constitutional document that stands above the present Constitution.
The difficulty with this approach lies in its practicality. To carry out the NCP’s proposal, the first step would be to hold fresh elections for a Constituent Assembly. This body would then adopt the July Charter, but the Charter itself is not a constitution. That means another step would still be required: either a second Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution implementing the Charter, or waiting for a newly elected Parliament to amend the existing constitution in line with the Charter’s reforms. The NCP’s plan is bold and principled, but it risks creating a long and complicated process.
On 7 September 2025, Jamaat submitted its proposals. The party suggested that the Interim Government should issue a Provisional Constitutional Order to put the July Charter into effect. Jamaat argued that this Order would draw its authority directly from the mass uprising of 5 August 2024. Jamaat has proposed that through this Order, the Charter should be treated as superior to all existing laws including the existing Constitution.. Any attempt to undermine the Order or to put other laws above it would according to Jamaat should be considered sedition.
One of the most striking aspects of the proposal relates to elections. The Provisional Constitutional Order would give the President the power to issue ordinances for holding national elections, but with strict conditions: elections must be conducted in line with the principles of the July Charter and the spirit of the 2024 uprising. This ensures that no political party or candidate can contest elections on a platform that goes against the values of the revolution. Jamaat has proposed that the Order should remain in force only until a new constitution is drafted and passed by Parliament with a three-fourths majority and then approved by the people in a national referendum.
Jamaat’s proposal may sound radical, but from a legal point of view it is solid. In fact, it is probably the most effective way to make sure the July Charter is fully implemented. Ideally, the idea of a Provisional Constitutional Order should have been introduced right after the uprising of 5 August 2024, when momentum was high and the people were ready for bold change. Now, more than a year later, that urgency has faded. Both the public and the authorities seem less willing to take on such a big shift in the constitutional system. By waiting too long to raise this idea, Jamaat has revealed a lack of political foresight.
There is thus no consensus on how the July Charter will be implemented. Most observers expect the BNP to return to power in the next national elections, yet the party has made it clear that it will not permit the Interim Government to carry out the Charter’s constitutional reforms. Instead, it intends to take on that task itself, working within the boundaries of the existing Constitution. The problem is that the BNP has offered no clear roadmap for handling those parts of the Charter that conflict with the Constitution’s basic structure. Without such clarity, doubts about its sincerity will persist. For the Charter to succeed, the BNP and the other major political parties must find common ground and agree on a workable plan. Otherwise, the risk remains that the July Revolution’s hard-won sacrifices will end up wasted, and the Charter will remain little more than words on paper.
The writer is a senior advocate, Supreme Court of Bangladesh
