Commission finds “systemic problem” behind enforced disappearances
NN Online:
The interim government-formed commission investigating enforced disappearances has concluded that a “systemic problem” within institutional culture — not merely isolated incidents of misconduct — was behind the widespread violations during the previous regime. The commission received over 1,800 related complaints.
In its second interim report, accessed by BSS, the commission stated:
“There was an environment in which such crimes were tacitly condoned, and those who committed them were not meaningfully regarded as offenders.”
Institutional Complicity, Not Rogue Actors
The report reveals that intelligence agencies had documented cases of enforced disappearances involving various security forces. A review of seven case files indicated prima facie evidence of complicity in serious crimes by certain officers. However, none of the reviewed files explicitly referred to the term “enforced disappearance” — despite its known prevalence at the time.
“It is almost impossible that intelligence agencies were unaware. These were not isolated acts by rogue individuals, but rather operations involving multiple members of organized units,” the report added.
Instead of referencing enforced disappearances, the files were filled with meticulous details about officers’ political affiliations — extending even to their family members, such as “wives’ aunts” — and included records of complaints like corruption or indiscipline. Yet, mentions of disappearances or extrajudicial killings were glaringly absent.
Silence Framed as “Operational Necessity”
The commission observed that this persistent institutional silence was likely driven by an internalized understanding that such actions were part of their “operational mandate,” deemed necessary for maintaining national security and public order.
One highlighted case involved a military officer seconded to the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), whom the commission has prima facie evidence against for involvement in disappearances. Despite this, then-RAB Director General Benazir Ahmed (later appointed Inspector General of Police) endorsed the officer as “very skilled,” “self-initiated,” and “honest.”
Ahmed praised the officer’s leadership and his role in anti-terror operations in Chattogram, claiming:
“No negative information was found about this officer.”
The commission remarked that this reflected how institutional norms shaped documentation — only rewarding performance, not acknowledging criminal behavior.
Chilling Case Studies and Confessions
The report cited a senior general who claimed he had implemented briefing and debriefing systems to prevent military officers in RAB from engaging in capital crimes. However, one debriefing session revealed a junior officer admitting to personally killing two people and witnessing four more killings.
When asked what he did with the financial rewards from the operation, the officer said:
“I donated the money to my village mosque.”
Another senior officer recalled confronting a subordinate who became more religious after his involvement in such crimes. He told the junior:
“Prayers are duties to God. But crimes committed against others are debts to people. God does not forgive those on your behalf.”
Yet, the same general did not initiate any investigation or report the confession — instead presenting the debriefing as evidence of his own vigilance.
Fear, Moral Conflict, and Lack of Accountability
The report exposes a climate where young officers felt powerless. In one instance, a RAB captive escaped briefly from a safe house but was recaptured. A young officer nearby was reportedly trembling — fearing harsh punishment from a notoriously ruthless superior if the captive had gotten away.
Another officer described how a colleague, heavily involved in disappearances, told him:
“I didn’t have the courage to refuse in the beginning. And now I’m stuck.”
These testimonies point to both a climate of fear and repeated failure by senior leadership to offer moral guidance or protection.
Broader Pattern Beyond the Military
The commission found that this culture extended to the police as well. Several sub-inspectors reported being coerced into signing documents prepared by superiors implicating them in unlawful acts — with little ability to refuse.
In conclusion, the commission’s findings suggest that enforced disappearances were not random or unsanctioned acts, but part of a deeply embedded institutional problem — one that enabled impunity, erased accountability, and failed to protect basic human rights.