Scroll.in :
As Bangladesh simmers after the violent quelling of student-led protests demanding a reform of the government’s quota system for jobs, a similar upheaval has been unfolding thousands of kilometres away in Africa.
In Kenya, a country of 54 million known to many Bangladeshis for its once-prominent cricket team and players like Steve Tikolo and Maurice Odumbe – who have competed in Dhaka’s domestic leagues – a wave of youth-led unrest emerged almost concurrently with the student-led protests in Bangladesh in July.
In late June, what began as a peaceful protest against proposed tax hikes in Kenya, grew into a widespread campaign for accountable governance, ultimately transforming into an anti-government movement demanding the resignation of the incumbent administration.
It mirrors the situation in Bangladesh where the student-led protests that began in early July escalated into a broader anti-government movement calling for Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s resignation and labelling her an “autocrat”. The protests were sparked after the quota system reserving 30% of the government jobs for the children of freedom fighters was reinstated.
In both countries, long-standing frustration with the economy and the government’s perceived indifference to the struggles of ordinary citizens has been mounting for a long time. In Bangladesh, with a gross domestic product of $460 billion – more than four times Kenya’s $113 billion – the economy has been in decline for several years, plagued by rising inflation and dwindling foreign reserves.
Kenya’s national debt has reached approximately $80 billion, nearly 75% of its annual economic output, with 65% of annual revenue allocated to debt repayment. To tackle this, the Kenyan government has been urgently seeking to boost revenue by imposing successive taxes over the past few years.
Alongside economic troubles in Bangladesh, there has been simmering resentment as government officials and ruling party beneficiaries accumulate wealth, a stark contrast to the struggles of ordinary citizens to afford basic necessities.
In Kenya, the movement gained momentum as people expressed outrage over steep tax increases imposed by the authorities, while the politically privileged class continued to indulge in extravagant spending without significant reductions.
Much like in Bangladesh, in Kenya, too, the agitation started out peacefully in mid-June, with citizens, mostly young voters, protesting in the streets for days, chanting slogans demanding the repeal of the new tax law. In Bangladesh, university students and young graduates had protested peacefully for nearly 10 days early in July before things took a grim turn.
Two key events significantly altered the course of the largely peaceful protests in both countries.
In Bangladesh, Hasina’s derogatory labeling of protesters as “razakars” on July 14 backfired, igniting a wave of protests among the students. Razakars is a derogatory reference to those who collaborated with Pakistan during Bangladesh’s liberation war. This tactic, which had long been used to discredit dissenters as traitors, failed to gain traction with the apolitical general public as well, leading to a violent backlash that resulted in over 200 deaths within the next six turbulent days.
In Kenya, protests turned deadly after young people, frustrated by legislators who passed the controversial finance bill during its second reading on June 29, tried to block its final approval.
Following the passage of the bill, they stormed the parliament and set parts of the building on fire. This triggered nationwide demonstrations and a harsh crackdown by President William Ruto’s administration, leading to police violence in which 50 were killed over the next four days.
In Bangladesh, Abu Sayeed, a 25-year-old university student from Rangpur, became the first known victim of police violence. Graphic live videos and photos captured him standing alone and resolute in front of armed police as they fired on a group of students. His death triggered a wave of protests that persisted for several days.
In Kenya, 19-year-old Ibrahim Kamau was the first casualty of police gunfire. Kamau, a recent high school graduate, was fatally shot twice in the neck as he and others stormed the parliament building. His death sparked unrest among young voters, who mobilised in large numbers across parts of Kenya.
In both countries, governments resorted to the same smoke and mirror policy and of propagating the narrative of peaceful protests being “hijacked” by miscreants.
The Awami League-led administration blamed the vandalism and arson on the usual suspects: the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party and its former far-right ally, Jamaat-e-Islami. The government claimed that these groups had taken over the student protests to advance their own agenda of overthrowing the government.
In Kenya, Ruto alleged that the youth-led protests had been commandeered by criminals aiming to destabilise the country through indiscriminate attacks on key government institutions.
Both leaders attempted to calm tempers. In Dhaka, Hasina, in a televised speech, promised to accelerate the legal process for reforming the quota system in government jobs and urged the student protesters to return home.
Ruto adopted a more rigid stance, pledging a “full, effective, and swift response” to what he labeled as “treasonous activities”.
Eventually, both governments conceded to the original demands that had sparked the protests. In Bangladesh, the government issued a circular reducing the quota in jobs from 56% to 7% after the appellate division of the Supreme Court on July 21 nullified the High Court order reinstating the quota system for government jobs.
In Kenya, Ruto capitulated, declaring that he would not approve the contentious finance bill.
The old and the new
There are notable differences however. Kenyan President Ruto has been in power for the past two years, and the 2022 election that brought him to office is regarded as one of the most “fair elections” in Kenya’s history since its independence in 1963.
Sheikh Hasina, however, has been in power since 2009, with the last three elections – 2014, 2018, and 2024 – each acquiring distinct labels among the Bangladeshis: “Boycotted election”, “Midnight election”, and “Dummy election.” Despite these differing labels, they share a common characteristic in that none are considered “free and fair” by neutral observers.